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REVISITING THE TAXATION OF FRINGE BENEFITS
Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas*
Abstract: The receipt of workplace fringe benefits has become increasingly ubiquitous.
As a result of their employment, employees often receive a cornucopia of fringe benefits,
including frequent-flier miles, hotel rewards points, rental car preferred status, office supply
dollar coupons, cellular telephone use, home internet service, and, in some instances, even
free lunches, massages, and dance lessons. Technological advances and workforce
globalization are important contributory factors to the popularity of what were, until the turn
of this century, previously unknown fringe benefits.
In years past, taxpayers could readily turn to the Internal Revenue Code to ascertain the
income tax effects and reporting responsibilities associated with fringe benefit receipt.
However, today’s fringe benefits have evolved far beyond what Congress contemplated when
it enacted fringe benefit reform over thirty years ago. As a result, the existing statutory tax
compliance framework does not adequately address the recent transformation of the
workplace, as many modern fringe benefits are not specifically excluded from the income tax
base yet are not currently being reported as taxable.
This Article examines what has been an increasingly commonplace phenomenon:
employers and employees ignoring their responsibilities to report the receipt of fringe
benefits as taxable income. It argues that Congress has an obligation to preserve the tax base
and, accordingly, must institute reform measures to ensure taxpayer compliance. Failure to
take action will trigger an expansion of such fringe benefit offerings, eroding the tax base and
jeopardizing the integrity of the income tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
Over a quarter of a century ago, through targeted legislative reforms,
Congress sought to end the practice of not reporting on-the-job fringe
benefits as taxable income.1 The congressional fixes are found in several
different Internal Revenue Code (Code) sections2: Code section 61(a)(1)
added the phrase “fringe benefits” to its description of gross income,3
Code section 132 excluded from gross income certain specifically
defined fringe benefits,4 and employment tax provisions (i.e., Code
sections 3121(a), 3306(b), 3401(a), and 3501(b)) expanded the
application of payroll taxes to include taxable fringe benefits.5 The

1. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. All Code references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884. The IRS defines “fringe benefit” as follows:
“A fringe benefit is a form of pay for the performance of services.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUBLICATION 15-B, EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS: FOR USE IN 2016, at 3 (2015),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T48-ATEJ].
4. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 877–81.
5. Id. § 531(d)(1)(A), (d)(3)–(5), 98 Stat. at 884–85.
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legislative history underlying these reform measures indicates that
Congress designed these Code sections to clarify the law, limit tax base
erosion, and curtail the practice of employers transforming taxable
remuneration into tax-free fringe benefits.6
But a surprising situation has recently occurred. The country is awash
in fringe benefits inuring to employees,7 a sizable portion of which
currently goes unreported as taxable income.8 These newly minted fringe
benefits generally fall within one of three categories: (1) “customer
6. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). The
legislative history warned that, absent reform and “without any well-defined limits on the ability of
employers to compensate their employees tax-free by providing noncash benefits having economic
value to the employee, new practices will emerge that could shrink the income tax base
significantly . . . [and] further shift a disproportionate tax burden to those individuals whose
compensation is in the form of cash.” Id. at 841.
7. For example, the provision of free cell phones to employees has become increasingly
ubiquitous. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 2014 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 22, tbl.D-1 (2014),
https://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/14-0301%20Beneftis_Report_
TEXT_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST8Z-TAG] (finding that forty-one percent of employers offer
free personal use of a business cell phone). A number of other fringe benefits have originated with
companies in Silicon Valley. See, e.g., Jillian D’Onfro & Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal
Their Favorite Perks Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (July 1, 2014, 10:06 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/google-employees-favorite-perks-2014-7# [https://perma.cc/9TE2YPMH] (describing the numerous fringe benefits that Google employees can enjoy); Meghan
Keneally, Noisy Massage Chairs, Over-Inflated Egos and Too Much Free Food, It’s a Hard Life at
Google: Employees Take to Web to Gripe About Their Job Perks, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:23
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2487276/Former-Google-employees-complain-jobperks.html [https://perma.cc/4AH3-6X8W] (same); J.P. Mangalindan, Google: The King of Perks,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2012, 3:18 PM), http://archive.fortune.com/galleries/2012/technology/
1201/gallery.best-companies-google-perks.fortune/2.html [https://perma.cc/BC95-L4AM] (same);
Melinda Wenner Moyer, Behind the Scenes at Google’s Cafeteria, BON APPÉTIT (Feb. 19, 2013,
10:00
AM),
http://www.bonappetit.com/trends/article/behind-the-scenes-at-google-s-cafeteria
[https://perma.cc/G3BF-C2UE] (“As if Google perks like nap pods and on-site masseuses didn’t
already stoke your envy, the tech giant has reinvented workday dining. Its offices in Mountain
View, California, and Manhattan have more than 35 canteens offering fresh, delicious meals and
hundreds of pantry-like ‘micro-kitchens’ stocked with snacks and beverages (including Kind
granola bars and Stumptown coffee). And it’s all free.”). Google is apparently not alone in offering
such benefits. Other technology companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Zynga, and Yahoo offer
generous fringe benefits as well. Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley’s Mouthwatering Tax Break,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873240503045784084
61566171752 [https://perma.cc/Y7JT-Z9KG].
8. See, e.g., Austin L. Lomax, Five-Star Exclusion: Modern Silicon Valley Companies Are
Pushing the Limits of Section 119 by Providing Tax-Free Meals to Employees, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2077 (2014) (describing the nonreporting practices of both employers and employees with
regard to the many third-party-provided fringe benefits of work); Michael Lundin & Claudia
Cowan, IRS Considers Taxing Work Perks Like Food, Gym Memberships, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 16,
2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/16/irs-considers-taxing-work-perks-like-foodgym-memberships/ [https://perma.cc/77XR-H597] (“The IRS reportedly is looking at these perks
and seeing if these companies need to start paying up for the free stuff they offer employees.”).
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loyalty programs” such as frequent-flier miles, rental car usage, hotel
frequency stays, and office supply purchases; (2) mixed-use
(business/personal) assets such as cellular phones and home internet
service; and (3) workplace lifestyle enhancements such as the receipt of
free lunches, massages, and dance classes. None of these benefits existed
in their present form until the turn of the century, and many are provided
by unrelated third-party vendors rather than the employers themselves.
The evolution of this new era of fringe benefits can be traced to
technological advancements and the increasing globalization of the
workforce over the past several decades.9
Because the aforementioned fringe benefits are not statutorily
excluded from gross income under Code section 132, they are
presumably includable in gross income under Code section 61.10
However, these new fringe benefits often go unreported, with no clear
statutory or regulatory justification.11 There are numerous possible
reasons why these fringe benefits are rarely reported as taxable income.
Their valuation is inherently problematic; their putative “tax-free status”
has tremendous political support; recordkeeping for these benefits is
administratively challenging; and, over the past quarter of a century,
payroll taxes have dramatically risen, making noncompliance more
economically attractive.12 Further, the nonreporting of certain benefits
like employer-provided cellphones has received the blessing of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS),13 while non-enforcement with respect to
other types of benefits (e.g., frequent flyer miles) suggests the IRS’s tacit
approval.
As more employers and employees take advantage of these
unreported fringe benefits, Congress must ponder its options. Possible
approaches include expanding the list of those fringe benefits excluded
from gross income, explicitly stating that some or all of the
aforementioned fringe benefits are taxable, and/or denying employer
deductions for expenditures pertaining to securing these fringe
benefits.14 In light of growing taxpayer noncompliance, Congress would
be wise not to ignore this problem.
This Article urges immediate congressional action. It argues that, if
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (finding that the congressional
intention is “to tax all gains except those specifically exempted”).
11. See Lomax, supra note 8, at 2082–83.
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See infra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part III.
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left unaddressed, the failure to tax modern fringe benefits will have
continuing pernicious effects on the income tax system. Not only does
failing to tax fringe benefits shortchange the government and public of
valuable tax revenue on income associated with those benefits, it also
perpetuates the notion that tax enforcement is arbitrary and ill-defined.15
Additionally, not enforcing taxation of certain fringe benefits, while
taxing comparable amounts of cash compensation, unfairly favors those
employees who have access to fringe benefits.16 Failing to tax fringe
benefits also encourages wasteful spending. More specifically, because
employers do not have to factor in taxes when setting compensation
amounts, it is cheaper for employers to compensate their employees with
untaxed fringe benefits instead of cash, resulting in their overprovision.
This Article makes several contributions to the existing literature.
First, it identifies and describes a new era of fringe benefits not
contemplated by the current statutory regime. We offer historical context
for the evolution of these fringe benefits and identify the unique
challenges that policymakers face in designing a workable tax scheme.
Next, we offer a number of concrete policy recommendations for taxing
fringe benefits in the modern era. While some commentators have
argued that modern fringe benefit offerings should be subject to tax in
theory,17 this Article offers practical guiding principles intended to
address concerns like valuation, recordkeeping, and the current political
climate.
In making its case, this Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, we
present an abbreviated history of fringe benefit taxation. Part II then
15. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income
Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 832 (2012) (criticizing I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621,
in which the agency declared that it will not pursue a tax-enforcement program with respect to
promotional programs, pointing out that unless Congress acts, the IRS will be able to create “a de
facto, or customary, gross income exclusion, despite the absence of any statutory authority for its
position”).
16. See, e.g., JOSEPH BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 61 (16th ed. 2012) (“Every
tax system that attempts to tax wage income must contend with the nettlesome problem of
employer-provided fringe benefits . . . . [F]ailing to tax these benefits creates problems of
fairness . . . .”); WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (5th ed. 1999)
(“Omission of noncash items in the computation of taxable income is unfair because it imposes a
smaller burden on some taxpayers than on others in similar overall circumstances.”); Note, Federal
Income Taxation of Employee Fringe Benefits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1142–43 (1976) (arguing
that failure to tax fringe benefits violates horizontal equity and is also regressive if highly
compensated employees have greater access to fringe benefits). But see Yehonatan Givati, Googling
a Free Lunch: The Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 69 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that,
in a competitive market, failing to tax fringe benefits does not violate horizontal equity because
employers will adjust the wages of employees who receive fringe benefits).
17. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 16.
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discusses the underlying nature of these newly minted fringe benefits
and their evolution alongside recent technological developments and
workplace globalization. In Part III, we discuss possible reform
measures that Congress should consider and their application.
I.

SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE TAXATION OF FRINGE
BENEFITS

From the inception of the income tax in 1913, the receipt of fringe
benefits has been an integral part of the nation’s economic landscape.18
Over this time period, the tax treatment of fringe benefits has undergone
three distinct stages: (1) the IRS issuance of informal and piecemeal
guidance, (2) the promulgation in 1976 of proposed regulations by the
Treasury Department, and (3) the passage of congressional legislation in
1984.
A.

IRS Guidance

The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution authorized a national
income tax, and in 1913 Congress quickly followed with the passage of
the nation’s first constitutionally sanctioned federal income tax.19
Needless to say, in its infancy, the income tax’s initial statutory
formulation was fairly rudimentary with few details expounded.20 In
many instances, it was implicitly delegated to the IRS to amplify the
law’s meaning.
When it came to the taxation of fringe benefits, on several occasions
the IRS responded to this embellishment challenge with administrative
rulings. The first instance was in 1920, when the IRS ruled that group
term life insurance did not constitute taxable income insofar as the
employee benefited “only in the feeling of contentment that provision
has been made for dependents. It is paid by the employer not as
18. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan & Dawson J. Price, Change and the Continuity in Fringe Benefit
Taxation: Seeking Sense and Sensibility, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 281, 302 (2014/15) (“From the
earliest days of the income tax system, Congress and the IRS have struggled to create a sensible
framework for the treatment of fringe benefits.”).
19. Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114.
20. If the number of words serves as a proxy for detail, consider the fact that in 1913 the income
tax law totaled approximately 11,000 words, see Tariff Act, 38 Stat. at 166–81; 144 CONG. REC.
H2136 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1998) (statement of Rep. Robert Goodlatte); by way of contrast, the
number of words presently in the Code exceeds one million, see Joseph Henchman, How Many
Words Is the Tax Code?, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-manywords-are-tax-code [https://perma.cc/9VKN-8T5Z] (estimating that in 2013 the Code contained
over one million words).
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compensation to the employee, but as an investment in increased
efficiency.”21 In the same year, the agency issued Office Decision (O.D.)
514,22 declaring that occasional cash meal allowances were excluded
from income.23 One year later, in O.D. 946,24 the IRS ruled that the value
of train travel offered to railroad employees and their families was
excluded from income as a gift, as long as the travel was “not provided
for in the contracts of employment.”25 Several decades later, in Revenue
Ruling 59-58,26 the IRS announced that de minimis fringe benefits are
not taxable; more specifically, “the value of a turkey, ham, or other item
of merchandise of similar nominal value, distributed by an employer to
an employee at Christmas, or a comparable holiday, as part of a general
distribution . . . as a means of promoting their good will” is exempt from
income.27
The foregoing IRS administrative rulings are marked by their brevity.
Notwithstanding this brevity, these rulings spawned entirely new
categories of income that were treated as exempt from taxation (without
any authorization from Congress).28 The group term insurance ruling led
employees to exclude from income the value of group term life
insurance offered by their employers (the precursor to Code section
79(a)); the “meal money” ruling undoubtedly led many employees to
believe that meals (and possibly lodging) furnished for the convenience
of their employers were not subject to taxation (the precursor to Code
section 119); the “train travel” ruling undoubtedly led many employees
to believe that no-additional-cost services provided by their employers
were not taxable (the precursor to Code section 132(b)); and the “turkey
and ham” ruling undoubtedly led many employees to believe that de
minimis fringe benefits that their employers provided were not taxable
(the precursor to Code section 132(e)).29
21. O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88, 89 (1920), 1920 WL 48481.
22. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920), 1920 WL 49099.
23. Id.
24. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921), 1921 WL 50801.
25. Id.
26. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 I.R.B. 17, 1959 WL 12389.
27. Id. at 18.
28. See Zelenak, supra note 15, at 843 (“As the government admitted in its brief in a 1962
Supreme Court case, under the IRS’s administrative practice fringe benefits were ‘not
generally . . . considered income to the employees even if the employer’s sole reason for providing
them [was] to confer a benefit upon the employees—e.g., provision of parking facilities, medical
services, swimming pools, libraries, courtesy discounts, etc.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Brief
for the United States at 39, Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (No. 396)).
29. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
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But the problem with the IRS approach to fringe benefit taxation was
its fragmentation and lack of overall cohesive structure. In the absence
of uniformity, some taxpayers pushed the definitional limits of what
constituted tax-free fringe benefits.30 Something more comprehensive
had to be implemented.
B.

Treasury Department Regulations

In an attempt to bring uniformity to the fringe benefit area of the law,
the Treasury Department in 1975 issued a discussion draft of allinclusive regulations.31 These regulations had three categories of benefits
that qualified for tax-free treatment: (1) those that resulted in no
substantial extra costs to employers, (2) those that passed a “facts and
circumstances” test, and (3) those that qualified as de minimis in
nature.32
Qualifying for the “no substantial costs to employers” provision
required the satisfaction of three conjunctive conditions: the goods or
services originated from the employer and were “primarily unrelated to
the personal use or consumption of such items by employees of the
employer,” the supplying employer incurred no substantial extra costs in
the provision of such goods or services, and there was no discrimination
of benefit offerings between and among employees.33 The Treasury
Department then cited two examples of such benefits: free flights offered
to airline attendants (precursor to Code section 132(b) (i.e., noadditional-cost services)) and merchandise discounts offered to store
employees (precursor to Code section 132(c) (i.e., qualified employee
discounts)).34
Next, under the so-called “facts and circumstances” test, the draft
regulations offered nine circumstances that tended “to indicate that the
benefit does not constitute compensation includable in gross income.”35

30. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-37-012 (May 25, 1983) (stating that a builder’s
proposed five percent to ten percent employee discount on the retail price of a home did not qualify
as a de minimis fringe benefit).
31. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (Sept. 5, 1975).
32. Id. § 1.61-16(a)–(c), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119–20.
33. Id. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119.
34. Id. § 1.61-16(f)(1), (3), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,120.
35. Id. § 1.61-16(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,119–20. Factors included whether the “benefit is provided
primarily to insure the employee’s safety by protecting against significant risk arising from the
employment relation,” whether “the benefit is not a substantial amount absolutely or in comparison
to the employee’s stated compensation,” and whether the benefit “generally is not thought of as
constituting compensation includible in gross income.” Id. § 1.61-16(b), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,120.
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These circumstances attempted to codify existing practices insofar as the
receipt of fringe benefits was concerned.36 However, many
commentators, practitioners, and politicians found this “facts and
circumstances” test so obtuse that they faulted its proposed application.37
Finally, the draft regulations offered an exception to the concept of
gross income for de minimis fringe benefits. Benefits that qualified for
this exception were defined as those items “so small as to make
accounting for [them] unreasonable or administratively impractical.”38 In
theory, this rationale made sense; however, the Treasury Department set
forth several examples (e.g., bar association dues paid by the taxpayer’s
law firm)39 that were neither small in absolute dollar amounts nor hard to
track and thus did not conform with the stated rationale for this
exception.
As drafted, the proposed Treasury regulations were not wellreceived.40 As a result, the Treasury Department withdrew them the
following year.41 Congress then stepped in and issued a moratorium on
the further issuance of regulations, rulings, or procedures that would
alter the historic tax treatment of fringe benefits.42 To avoid leaving a
legislative void, however, Congress established a special fringe benefit
task force that went to work on putting together draft legislation.43
C.

Congressional Legislation

In 1984, Congress sought to bring uniformity to this area of the law. It
therefore passed sweeping legislation, embodied in the Deficit
36. See Note, supra note 16, at 1163–64; see also Fringe Benefits; Notice of Publication of
Discussion Draft of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118, 41,118–19 (proposed Sept. 5, 1975) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12) (discussing the need to provide guidance with respect to administrative
practices that allowed exclusion of certain fringe benefits from employees’ income).
37. See Note, supra note 16, at 1163–69 (critiquing the nine factors and finding some to be
“problematic” and “puzzling”).
38. Fringe Benefits; Notice of Publication of Discussion Draft of Regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. at
41,119.
39. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(f)(17), 40 Fed. Reg. at 41,121.
40. See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS ¶ 63.1.1. (rev. 3d ed. 2005) (“Caught in a heated cross fire between critics who found the
proposed regulations too lenient and those who thought they were too severe, the Treasury withdrew
its draft in 1976.”).
41. Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg.
56,334 (1976).
42. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996.
43. STAFF OF TASK FORCE ON EMP. FRINGE BENEFITS, H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 96TH
CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT BILL AND REPORT ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS (Comm. Print
1979).
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Reduction Act of 1984,44 that fundamentally transformed the fringe
benefit landscape.45 The stated objectives of this legislation were
threefold: first, to “codify the ability of employers to continue many of
these practices without imposition of income or payroll taxes”;46 second,
to “set forth clear boundaries for the provision of tax-free benefits”;47
and third, to “[curtail] new practices [that might] emerge that could
shrink the income tax base significantly . . . . [and] further shift a
disproportionate tax burden to those individuals whose compensation is
in the form of cash.”48
How did Congress accomplish its stated objectives? First, it clarified
the scope of Code section 61 by explicitly including the phrase “fringe
benefits.”49 Next, it added Code section 132, which specifically
enumerated those fringe benefits that were to be excluded from gross
income.50 Finally, it expanded the payroll tax provisions to include
within their scope the value of fringe benefits that inured to employees’
benefit.51
At the time, the sweeping congressional solution to the problem of
fringe benefit taxation was generally lauded by both the academic
community and the general public52—and for good reason: Congress had
instituted what seemed to be a comprehensive and practical solution to
the receipt of tax-free fringe benefits, a problem that had previously
plagued the nation and threatened the integrity of the tax base. From a
legislative perspective, it was therefore hailed, giving the appearance
that this area of the law could theoretically be put on autopilot.
But soon after Congress instituted this comprehensive legislative
reform, a series of unanticipated events unfolded that fundamentally
transformed the topography of the fringe benefit landscape: customer
loyalty programs came into vogue,53 new technological devices and
services emerged (i.e., cellular telephones and the internet),54 and the
44. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
45. Id.
46. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 840.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 841.
49. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884.
50. Id. § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 877–81.
51. Id. § 531(d), 98 Stat. at 884–85.
52. See generally Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty
Years, 25 VA. TAX REV. 977 (2006).
53. See infra Section II.A.1.
54. See infra Section II.A.2.
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workforce became more globalized.55 The 1984 congressional legislation
left unaddressed how the fringe benefits associated with these
transformative events should be taxed.
The next Part of this Article explores the nature of these
transformative events and how they led to the emergence of new
categories of fringe benefits the likes of which were entirely unknown
until the turn of the twenty-first century.
II.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND THE
REENGINEERED FRINGE BENEFIT

While it is not easy to make broad generalizations about the twentyfirst century and the Information Era,56 there is at least one noticeable
trend when it comes to workplace fringe benefits. In the past, fringe
benefits predominately originated directly from employers (e.g., seeking
to build camaraderie and kinship, an employer would offer significant
discounts to its employees on the products it sold).57 Fringe benefits of
this nature no doubt will continue to be a vibrant part of the nation’s
employment landscape. What is truly new in the twenty-first century,
however, is the advent of fringe benefits that typically originate from
third-party vendors, such as airlines, hotel chains, rental car companies,
office supply vendors,58 and internet and cell phone providers. These
modern benefits represent a departure from the fringe benefits of
yesteryear, which typically involved employers providing discounted or
free use of their own goods or services, such as railroad employees
receiving free train travel. While the legislative history to section 132
clearly contemplates exempting many employer-provided fringes, there
is no indication that Congress intended to extend this treatment to thirdparty provided benefits.59 These third-party-provided fringe benefits
55. See infra Section II.A.3.
56. For a concise description of the so-called Information Age, see generally NICHOLAS
NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
57. See generally Fringe Benefit, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA U.S. ECON. HIST.,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Fringe_Benefit.aspx [https://perma.cc/G4PJ-2X76] (last visited
May 8, 2016) (“Fringe benefits can be generally divided into those offered individually, such as
401(k) retirement plans, and those offered to employees as a group, such as daycare facilities or free
lunch.”).
58. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, A History of the Frequent Flyer Program, 38 TAX NOTES 1311
(1988) (describing how the frequent-flier program got off the ground).
59. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 6, at 840 (“Congress was aware that in
many industries, employees may receive, either free or at a discount, goods and services which the
employer sells to the general public. . . . Although employees receive an economic benefit from the
availability of these free or discounted goods or services, employers often have valid business
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financially benefit employees and are not specifically exempt from
income;60 nevertheless, they often go unreported by both employers and
employees.61
This Part is arranged as follows: Section A explores the genesis of
modern fringe benefits that, prior to the turn of the twenty-first century,
were largely unknown. Section B offers a brief theoretical overview of
how the receipt of these fringe benefits should be taxed.62 Section C
details the reasons that such fringe benefits often go unreported. Finally,
Section D provides an overview of the current political landscape and
the challenges of reform.
A.

The Advent of Modern Fringe Benefits

As the nation has progressed from the Industrial Era (when
manufacturing dominated the economic marketplace)63 to the PostIndustrial Era (when service offerings dominated the economic
marketplace)64 to the Information Era (when computers and technology
dominate the economic marketplace),65 the workplace has been
reshaped, work-related technology has filtered into employees’ personal
lives, and globalization has led to intense competition to lure the best
and brightest minds—all of which has led to the emergence of new kinds
of fringe benefits. This fringe benefit evolution is developed and
explored in the following three subsections: (1) the growth of customer
loyalty programs, (2) the ubiquity of cellular telephones and internet
service, and (3) the fundamental transformation of the employee
workplace.
1.

Customer Loyalty Programs

In the modern era of fringe benefits, many employees earn rewards
through customer loyalty programs like airline frequent-flier programs.
reasons, other than simply providing compensation, for encouraging employees to avail themselves
of the products which those employees sell to the public.”).
60. I.R.C. § 132(a) (2012).
61. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(d), 98 Stat. 494, 884–85 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
62. The tax consequences associated with each of these benefits will be discussed in considerably
more detail in Part III.
63. For a concise description of the so-called Industrial Era, see generally T.S. ASHTON, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1760–1830 (1948).
64. For a concise description of the so-called Post-Industrial Era, see generally DANIEL BELL,
THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1976).
65. See NEGROPONTE, supra note 56.
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In the employment context, these rewards are generally earned through
business-related travel expenses or office supply expenses that are paid
for by the employer either directly or through reimbursements. Although
the employer incurs the out-of-pocket costs that generate the rewards,
the rewards generally inure to the benefit of the employees. For
example, an employee might accrue enough frequent-flier miles through
work-related travel to purchase a free airline ticket to use on his next
vacation. These relatively new fringe benefits are a by-product of a
rapidly growing customer loyalty program industry.
The genesis of customer loyalty rewards programs likely dates back
to select supermarket chains offering S&H Green Stamps to their repeat
customers.66 The more frequently customers returned and made
purchases, the more S&H Green Stamps they would earn, which were
redeemable for “free” gifts.67 Because these so-called free gifts were
essentially bargain purchases, neither Congress nor the IRS ever sought
to tax their economic value.68
As the technology underlying computer software advanced and data
storage capacities grew, the opportunity for more sophisticated customer
loyalty programs expanded. Customers would no longer have to lick and
maintain books of musty stamps. The airline industry was the first to tap
into this then-novel technology. In May 1981, with new computer
programs and enhanced data storage capacities in hand, American

66. Jennifer Lach, Redeeming Qualities, ADVERT. AGE (May 1, 2000), http://adage.com/article/
american-demographics/redeeming-qualities/42382/ [https://perma.cc/3MJQ-UYWT]. The name
“S&H” derives from the issuer of the stamps, the Sperry & Hutchinson Company. Id.
67. Today, S&H has converted its Green Stamps into “Greenpoints,” which can be redeemed
online for gift cards from retailers like Barnes & Noble, Fandango, and Sports Authority. S&H
GREENPOINTS, http://w3.greenpoints.com/ [https://perma.cc/CEJ8-RNH2] (last visited June 8,
2015).
68. Taxpayers who purchase goods or services at arm’s length generally do not realize gross
income in connection with a bargain purchase, whether it is in the form of a seller rebate or a below
fair-market-value price. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 707 (1956); Rev. Rul.
2008-26, 2008-1 C.B. 985; Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23. In the case of customer rewards
programs, the predominant view is that such rewards are equivalent to nontaxable rebates if they are
earned through cash purchases by the customer. For example, in the case of cash rewards earned
through personal airline travel, the IRS has ruled that:
a passenger will not realize gross income upon the receipt of a cash payment if the flights that
entitled the passenger to receive the payment were undertaken for personal, nondeductible
purposes. Instead, the payment will simply reduce the passenger’s cost of the tickets purchased
under a purchase price adjustment rationale.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9340007 (June 29, 1993), http://www.legalbitstream.com/scripts/
isyswebext.dll?op=get&uri=/isysquery/irl83c2/1/doc [https://perma.cc/8XHZ-NYBS]; see also
Sharon Alice Pouzar, Frequent Flyer Awards as Taxable Income: Time to Pay the Tax Man, 5 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1998).
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Airlines launched the world’s first-ever frequent-flier program,69 and a
few months later both Delta and TWA followed with frequent-flier
programs of their own.70
As the airline industries’ frequent-flier programs soared, businesses in
the hotel industry began to develop loyalty programs of their own. At
first, the hotel industry partnered with the airline industry, offering
frequent-flier miles to those guests who repeatedly used their services.71
Soon thereafter, however, the hotel industry developed its own loyalty
programs. In January 1983, for example, Holiday Inn launched the
world’s first large-scale hotel loyalty program, which was quickly
followed by Marriott doing the same.72
The rental car industry mimicked the hotel industry’s approach. It
initially partnered with the airline industry to offer frequent-flier miles,
but as technology advanced many rental car companies independently
devised their own customer loyalty programs.73 The first to offer such a
stand-alone program was National Rental Car—in March 1987, it
introduced its Emerald Club,74 which was followed by similar programs
offered by the majority of other rental car companies.75
69. Lee S. Garsson, Frequent Flyer Bonus Programs: To Tax or Not to Tax—Is This the Only
Question?, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 973 (1987); David M. Rowell, A History of U.S. Airline
Deregulation Part 4: 1979–2010: The Effects of Deregulation—Lower Fares, More Travel,
Frequent Flier Programs, TRAVEL INSIDER (Aug. 13, 2010), http://thetravelinsider.info/
airlinemismanagement/airlinederegulation2.htm [https://perma.cc/UG73-F37R].
70. See Rowell, supra note 69.
71. See Ed Watkins, The History and Evolution of Hotel Loyalty, HOTEL NEWS NOW (Aug. 11,
2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Article/11029/The-history-and-evolution-of-hotelloyalty#sthash.FUEljQdH.dpuf [https://perma.cc/HJ7Q-LFGA] (“The first generation of hotel
loyalty schemes were simply conduits to airline programs: Currency earned in hotel programs could
be used toward free flights on participating airlines.”).
72. See id. (“Two brands lay claim to firsts involving frequency programs in the hotel industry.
Holiday Inn launched its program in February 1983, followed by Marriott in November of the same
year.”).
73. Ryan Lile, How Rental Car Companies Can Get More Mileage, COLLOQUY (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://www.colloquy.com/latest-news/how-rental-car-companies-can-get-more-mileage/
[https://perma.cc/6KET-QHRW] (“Until recently, rental car companies had not done much to
differentiate themselves in terms of loyalty. These companies have interfaced with airline and hotel
programs by offering renters frequent flyer miles or hotel points, but have not innovated loyalty
products of their own.”).
74. Press Release, Enter. Holdings, National Car Rental’s Emerald Club Marks 25 Years of
Customer Choice, Convenience (Mar. 8, 2012), https://www.enterpriseholdings.com/pressroom/national-car-rentals-emerald-club-marks-25-years-of-customer-choice-convenience.html
[https://perma.cc/7T3E-J63A] (“National Car Rental, the premier car rental brand for business
travel, this month celebrates the 25th anniversary of the Emerald Club, the car rental industry’s first
frequent renter program. The Emerald Club launched on St. Patrick’s Day in 1987.”).
75. See, e.g., Gold Plus Rewards, HERTZ, https://www.hertz.com/rentacar/emember/rewardsoverview/loyalty-free-travel-program [https://perma.cc/JX48-8FVG] (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).
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The popularity of customer loyalty programs extends well beyond the
service industry. Beginning in April 2007, for example, office supply
companies such as Staples began to offer customer loyalty programs.76
The business platform of such programs is simple: purchase your office
supplies with us, and, in return, we will award you with “cash coupons”
that you can use in any fashion that you want throughout the store,
including to purchase personal-use items such as electronic devices,
furniture, and supplies.77
Fast-forward to the present. Customer loyalty programs are
omnipresent and continue to grow in popularity. Facts and figures
regarding these programs are stunning. U.S. consumers held more than
three billion customer loyalty program memberships in 2014, over 900
million of which were attributable to the travel and hospitality
industries.78 Total memberships are up twenty-six percent from 2012 and
have more than tripled since 2000.79 A 2010 study estimated the total
value of customer rewards and points to be $48 billion, with over $17
billion allocable to airline, hotel, and other travel-related rewards.80 As
76. Staples Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Staples_Inc [https://perma.cc/PR4Y5N29] (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
77. Staples Rewards Program, STAPLES.COM, http://www.staples.com/sbd/content/help-center/
staples-rewards-program.html#10005_14 [https://perma.cc/AWS8-GDL2] (last visited June 24,
2015) (“For any purchase you make (excluding postage stamps, phone/gift cards, savings passes),
you earn up to 5% back in rewards. Staples Rewards® are issued online monthly at
staples.com/rewards in increments of $5. Monthly balances of less than $5 will roll over through the
end of the following calendar quarter.”).
78. JEFF BERRY, THE 2015 COLLOQUY LOYALTY CENSUS: BIG NUMBERS, BIG HURDLES 5
(2015), https://www.colloquy.com/resources/pdf/reports/2015-loyalty-census.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MGF9-WKRX].
79. Id. at 2 (“The big finding in the 2015 Census is that the membership growth shows no signs of
slowing . . . .”); see also Lena Steinhoff & Robert W. Palmatier, Understanding Loyalty Program
Effectiveness: Managing Target and Bystander Effects, J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI., Aug. 22, 2014,
http://foster.uw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/loyalty-program.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5LLZZHB] (“Loyalty programs, in business practice and as a focus of marketing research, have become
vastly popular, such that U.S. companies spend more than $1.2 billion on them each year, program
participation has topped 2.6 billion, and the average U.S. household subscribes to 21.9 different
programs.”); The Lowdown on Customer Loyalty Programs, FORBES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2007),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/01/02/frequent-flyer-miles-ent-sales-cx_kw_0102whartonloyalty.html
[https://perma.cc/D8K8-R5YW] (“According to Jupiter Research, more than 75% of consumers
today have at least one loyalty card, and the number of people with two or more is estimated to be
one-third of the shopping population. Surveys by information-technology analysts Gartner,
Forrester Research and META Group suggest the data-for-dollars explosion is showing no signs of
letting up anytime soon.”).
80. NANCY GORDON & KELLY HLAVINKA, COLLOQUY TALK, BURIED TREASURE: THE 2011
FORECAST OF U.S. CONSUMER LOYALTY PROGRAM POINTS VALUE (2011),
http://www.swiftexchange.com/Content/Documents/2011-COLLOQUY-Liability-Talk-WhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQN2-T76R].
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evidenced by these dollar figures and participant numbers, customer
loyalty programs are obviously no longer in their infancy. To the
contrary, they have hit full stride, and there is every reason to believe
that their popularity will persist and continue to grow.81
2.

Mixed-Use Goods and Services

A second recent development in fringe benefits is the provision of
goods or services with a mixed personal/business component, such as
smartphones (or other cell phones), cellular service, and/or internet
service. This increasingly commonplace practice82 reflects both
developments in technology and growing demands on employees to be
available 24/7.
Over the last two decades, the ease of communication has increased at
a dizzying pace. For example, telephones that were once anchored to a
particular location are no longer tethered and are usable virtually
anywhere throughout the world.83 Similarly, computers that were once
stationary and immobile have shed lots of pounds and can easily be
carried around on one’s person.84 Finally, the internet, which until fairly
recently did not exist, is now universally accessible.85
These technological developments led to the development of a more
demanding work environment for employees. Consider how in
yesteryear one’s work environment and personal life were completely
separated. When employees left the office or plant, they typically
entered an entirely different realm of their existence. They went home,
had dinner, perhaps watched television, read the newspaper, and/or
attended their child’s scholastic or sporting events. From a practical
perspective, this disconnect between an employee’s work and home
made sense because if the office or plant were physically closed, in most
instances, only limited communications could be had with office
81. See STEPHAN A. BUTSCHER, CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAMMES AND CLUBS 20–28 (2002)
(explaining the popularity of customer loyalty programs and why they flourish); ARTHUR
MIDDLETON HUGHES, THE CUSTOMER LOYALTY SOLUTION: WHAT WORKS (AND WHAT DOESN’T)
IN CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAMS 2 (2003) (“[I]t is now possible to keep, economically, in a
computer the kind of information on customers that the old corner grocer used to keep in his head
and to use that to build lasting, profitable relationships with customers.”).
82. See supra note 7.
83. See generally GUY KLEMENS, THE CELLPHONE: THE HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE
GADGET THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2010).
84. See generally MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY ET AL., COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF THE
INFORMATION MACHINE (2014).
85. See generally JOHNNY RYAN, A HISTORY OF THE INTERNET AND THE DIGITAL FUTURE
(2013).
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personnel and clients. But the communications industry has had a
transformative effect on the manner in which people presently conduct
their business and personal lives. When people leave the office or plant
for the day, no longer do they necessarily stop working. Instead, on their
daily commute, many employees return business telephone calls, text
messages, and exchange e-mail. When they are home, they often engage
in the exact same activities; and, even when they are on vacation, people
stay “connected” with their office.86 The erstwhile clear demarcation line
between people’s business and personal lives has never been so blurred.
And while communication costs have declined significantly, staying
in touch is still far from free. The annual cost of cell phone ownership is
in the neighborhood of $1200,87 and the annual cost of securing home
internet service (which depends in large part on the speed that a user
chooses) can run as much as $3600.88 For an average family, these outof-pocket expenses can constitute a sizable portion of their disposable
income.89 When an employer alleviates this financial burden by picking
up the tab for such costs, it is a significant job perk; when these job
perks are not reported as taxable income, it is a serendipitous bonus.

86. See, e.g., Americans Stay Connected to Work on Weekends, Vacation and Even When Out
Sick, APA.ORG (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2013/09/connectedwork.aspx [https://perma.cc/H7GL-L3AW] (“More than half of employed adults said they check
work messages at least once a day over the weekend (53 percent), before or after work during the
week (52 percent) and even when they are home sick (54 percent). More than 4 in 10 workers (44
percent) reported doing the same while on vacation.”).
87. See, e.g., Dave Smith, Cell Phone Bills Are Up 50% Since the iPhone Was Invented, BUS.
INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-cell-phone-bills-are-up50-since-the-iphone-was-invented-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/KHZ2-7QDN] (“Households spent an
average of $913 on phone bills in 2013—and a fifth of those households spent more than $1,400
that year.”).
88. See, e.g., Brian Fung, The Price of the Internet Is Too High, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/28/the-price-of-internet-is-too-high/
[http://perma.cc/33RF-KCRN] (“In American cities like New York, you can buy a 500 Mbps
connection that’s 58 times faster than the U.S. average. Here’s the catch: It’ll cost you $300 a
month . . . .”). On the other hand, a connection speed of only twenty-five Mbps would cost roughly
$50 per month. See Hannah Yi, This Is How Internet Speed and Price in the U.S. Compares to the
Rest
of
the
World,
PBS
NEWSHOUR
(Apr.
26,
2015,
12:54
PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/
internet-u-s-compare-globally-hint-slower-expensive/ [https://perma.cc/P4DR-BT4M].
89. Anton Troianovski, Cell Phones Are Eating the Family Budget, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2012,
3:28
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444083304578018731890309450
[https://perma.cc/E92C-FGB3] (“Government data show people have spent more on phone bills
over the past four years, even as they have dialed back on dining out, clothes and entertainment—
cutbacks that have been keenly felt in the restaurant, apparel and film industries.”).
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Lifestyle Enhancements

Over the last several decades, the nature of many workplace
environments has shifted from work-centric to life-encompassing. With
this evolution of the workplace has come a new breed of fringe benefits
that serve as lifestyle enhancements, such as free massages and gourmet
meals. An examination of the twentieth-century workplace compared to
the workplace of today demonstrates why this shift in environment has
occurred.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the United States was in the
midst of its Industrial Revolution. At that time and for many decades
thereafter, the workplace environment was fairly staid: employees
commuted to work, performed their duties, and then commuted home. 90
In many instances, there was almost a complete separation between
one’s work and home and the activities that transpired at each location.
Certainly, prior to the advent of telephones, it was virtually impossible
to have on-the-job personal communications with friends, family, and
loved ones outside of work. Indeed, even when telephones were
introduced into the workplace, the calls incurred charges,91 constituting a
dissuasive factor in employees making personal calls. The same was true
when employees left work: most had no home telephones, and thus there
was virtually no way for them to stay in touch with the business
enterprise. Even after home telephones came into vogue, making workrelated calls remained an expensive undertaking.
But technological advancements and globalization have transformed
the workplace. The workplace is no longer an isolated island separated
in space and time from one’s personal life. Now, with a click of a mouse
or push of a button on their computers or smartphones, employees can
get instant access to their personal e-mail, as well as Facebook and other
social media accounts, allowing them to communicate with anyone they
wish while at work.92 This connectedness makes sense as workdays have
90. See, e.g., DONALD M. FISK, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN LABOR IN THE
20TH CENTURY (2001), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20th-century.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RB8-DVBF] (“Electricity was in less than 10 percent of the nation’s homes at the
turn of the century, but it was almost universal by the end of the century.”); see also CAMPBELLKELLY ET AL., supra note 84, at 3–20 (detailing the few mechanical machines that were available in
offices at the turn of the nineteenth century).
91. See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS
pt. 7 (1996 ed.), http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/
SOCC/95socc.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3XX-SWL2] (detailing the varying telephone toll costs that
major communication carriers charged among different cities).
92. While some employers restrict access to personal e-mail, social networking, and other
websites on office computers, employees can generally still access these from their own personal
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become longer and people’s daily commutes have generally increased in
duration.93 Globalization is another factor that has transformed the
workplace. With a world marketplace and twenty-four time zones, there
is now never a time period when everything is closed. To the contrary, a
business can stay fully operational at all times during the day because
something is always happening somewhere, whether it be the European
or Asian markets. To stay competitive, many employees are putting in
longer hours.94
Due to this overlap between work and personal lives, employers have
tried to make the workplace more enticing and employee friendly. These
efforts have perhaps made their greatest mark in Silicon Valley, where
there has been a concerted effort to coalesce employees’ business and
personal lives into a coherent whole. The manifestations of this
coalescence are found at work locations that feature a wide array of
perks seeking to transcend traditional work/personal boundaries.95 These
at-work offerings include personal concierge services, housecleaning
services, laundry machines and dry-cleaning services, haircuts, bowling
alleys, yoga classes, and dance lessons, often staffed by outside thirdparty providers.96
The workplace trend set in Silicon Valley is not an isolated
phenomenon. Throughout the country, many other businesses have
attempted to replicate the Silicon Valley workplace model.97 This trend
devices like smartphones or tablets.
93. See, e.g., BRIAN MCKENZIE & MELANIE RAPINO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS-15,
COMMUTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 4 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acs15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YF6-7XT9] (“Figure 3 shows mean travel time since 1980, the first year
the census collected travel-time information. The mean travel time for workers was just under 22
minutes in 1980, then increased between 1980 and 2000 to about 25 minutes, where it remained in
2009.”).
94. Lydia Saad, The “40-Hour” Work Week Is Actually Longer—By Seven Hours, GALLUP (Aug.
29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hour-workweek-actually-longer-seven-hours.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SL7Q-CNKS] (“Adults employed full time in the U.S. report working an average
of 47 hours per week, almost a full workday longer than what a standard five-day, 9-to-5 schedule
entails. In fact, half of all full-time workers indicate they typically work more than 40 hours, and
nearly four in 10 say they work at least 50 hours.”).
—By Seven Hours, GALLUP (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175286/hour-workweekactually-longer-seven-hours.aspx [https://perma.cc/SL7Q-CNKS] (“Adults employed full time in
the U.S. report working an average of 47 hours per week, almost a full workday longer than what a
standard five-day, 9-to-5 schedule entails. In fact, half of all full-time workers indicate they
typically work more than 40 hours, and nearly four in 10 say they work at least 50 hours.”).
97. See, e.g., Barry Jaruzelski, Why Silicon Valley’s Success Is So Hard to Replicate, SCI. AM.
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-silicon-valleys-success-is-so-hardto-replicate/ [https://perma.cc/Y7UP-URM6] (“To be sure, pockets of innovation have emerged on a
smaller scale elsewhere in the U.S., like North Carolina’s Research Triangle and the Route 128
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suggests that businesses will continue to expand existing fringe benefit
offerings and add new perks to lure the world’s most talented workforce.
B.

Overview of the Taxation of Third-Party-Provided Fringe Benefits

In theory, the taxation of fringe benefit receipt should be
rudimentary. As an accretion to their wealth, taxpayers who receive
fringe benefits from their employers should initially assume that their
receipt constitutes taxable income.98 Next, they should examine
whether the fringe benefit in question qualifies under one of eight
exclusions to taxability found in Code section 132.99 If the fringe
benefit in question does not qualify within the scope of one of these
eight exclusions, its value must be included in gross income, unless
another Code exclusion applies (which is rarely the case). If it does
qualify by falling within the scope of one of these eight exclusions, its
value is excluded from gross income.
Applying this general framework to modern fringe benefits
requires a close examination of the Code section 132 exclusions.
Section 132 lists eight specific fringe benefits that are excluded from
income: (1) no-additional-cost services, (2) qualified employee
discounts, (3) working condition fringes, (4) de minimis fringes, (5)
qualified transportation fringes, (6) qualified moving expense
reimbursements, (7) qualified retirement planning services, and (8)
qualified military base realignment and closure fringes.100
The vast majority of these exclusions have no plausible
application to the modern fringe benefits described here.101 Indeed, only
two of the foregoing exclusions are possible candidates for application,
namely, working condition fringes and de minimis fringes.
Code section 132(d) defines “working condition fringe” as “any
property or services provided to an employee of the employer to the
extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services, such
Corridor outside Boston.”).
98. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
99. Id. § 132(a).
100. Id. § 132(a)(1)–(8).
101. Although perhaps not immediately apparent from their respective labels, “no-additional-cost
services” and “qualified employee discounts” are not relevant to the types of benefits at issue in this
analysis, which generally involve third-party providers. No-additional-cost services involve services
that are otherwise provided in the ordinary course of the employer’s business (e.g., air travel
provided by an airline). See id. § 132(b). Qualified employee discounts similarly involve discounts
on goods or services provided in the ordinary course of the employer’s business (e.g., a merchandise
discount provided to employees of the store in which the merchandise is sold). Id. § 132(c).
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payment would be allowable as a deduction [as an ordinary and
necessary business expense, or it would be depreciable].”102 As
expressed in the legislative history, common examples of working
condition fringe benefits include magazine subscriptions, personal
bodyguards for security reasons, and on-the-job training classes.103
Code section 132(e) defines “de minimis fringe” as “any property or
service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency
with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the
employer’s employees) so small as to make accounting for it
unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”104 Common examples
of excludable de minimis fringe benefits include “occasional cocktail
parties, group meals, or picnics for employees and their guests; [and]
traditional birthday or holiday gifts of property (not cash) with low fair
market value.”105 Common examples of benefits that would not qualify
as de minimis fringe benefits include “season tickets to sporting or
theatrical events; the commuting use of an employer-provided
automobile or other vehicle more than one day a month; [and]
membership in a private country club or athletic facility.”106
With the foregoing analytical framework in mind, we consider
whether Code section 132(d) (working condition fringes) or 132(e) (de
minimis fringes) excludes from income the modern fringe benefits
described in the prior section.

102. Id. § 132(d).
103. H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1601–02 (1984).
104. The Treasury regulations posit two ways in which frequency should be measured. The first
is “[e]mployee-measured frequency.” Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). Under this
test, what each individual employee receives from the employer is measured. For example, if one
employee out of a hundred always receives lunch daily, its value is not de minimis because of the
frequency with which lunch is received, albeit, as measured by the entire workforce, such meals are
infrequently provided. The second frequency test is “[e]mployer-measured frequency.” Id. § 1.1326(b)(2). This test may only be utilized if, due to administrative tracking burdens, the “[e]mployeemeasured frequency” test is unavailable. Id.; see also Memorandum from Jerry E. Holmes, Chief,
Emp’t Tax Branch 2, Dep’t of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv. (Dec. 31, 2001),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0219005.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CKC-B36H]. Under this second
test, what is measured is the frequency with which an employer provides goods and/or services to its
employees, taking into account the size of the entire workforce. Thus, if a photocopy machine is
restricted to general business use and one employee out of a hundred frequently makes copies on his
family’s behalf, his use would still qualify as de minimis in nature because, from the employer’s
vantage point, there is infrequent overall employee use. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(2).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1).
106. Id. § 1.132-6(e)(2).
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Customer Loyalty Programs

First, consider the nature of customer loyalty programs. These
programs award frequent-flier miles, hotel rewards points, and rental car
bonuses. On the one hand, if employees are mandated to use these
program benefits to lessen future business-related expenses, such
benefits do not constitute taxable income to employees.107 To illustrate,
suppose that an employee takes four business trips to the United
Kingdom and, by doing so, earns enough frequent-flier miles, hotel
rewards points, and rental car bonuses so that on his next business trip to
Paris (or anywhere else in the world) he can fly, sleep, and drive for free.
Notwithstanding the receipt of these free benefits, there is no personal
inurement and hence no taxable income. Put somewhat differently, these
“free” benefits reduce the operating expenses of the business enterprise;
and, as such, the initial four purchases combined with the fifth free trip
constitute nothing other than a bargain purchase for the employer.108
On the other hand, when employees are given free rein and can use
customer loyalty programs for their personal benefit, a different tax
outcome results. More specifically, suppose in the prior example that the
employee uses the customer loyalty program to his advantage so that his
next trip is a personal vacation for himself and his wife, where they each
enjoy a free flight to Paris, free hotel stay while there, and the free use of
a rental car to cruise the Champs-Élysées. None of these benefits fall
within the exclusions found in Code section 132. In particular, they are
not working condition fringe benefits because had the employee himself
utilized his own funds for such expenditures, they would not have been
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.109 Moreover,
due to their relatively high fair market value, the airfare, hotel, and rental
car do not fall within the scope of de minimis fringe benefits.110 Since no
fringe benefit exclusion applies, the fair market value of these benefits
should be included in the employee’s gross income.111

107. See Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23; JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX:
DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 71–73 (2d ed. 1999) (explaining the tax-free nature of
“commercial bargain purchases”).
108. See supra note 107.
109. I.R.C. § 132(d) (2012). Amounts spent on a vacation generally would be considered
nondeductible personal expenses. See id. § 262.
110. Id. § 132(e).
111. Id. § 61(a).
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Mixed-Use Goods and Services

Next, consider situations where, as part of their employment package,
employees receive a smartphone and home internet service. From an
employer’s perspective, this often makes incontrovertible business
sense: at virtually all times, employees can be readily reached by the
employer and/or clients. Conversely, employees can keep their
employers and/or clients apprised of existing or prospective business.
Because the costs associated with smartphone and home internet service
use are ordinarily fixed, employers generally will be indifferent if and
when employees use such items for their personal use.
The question becomes thus: if an employee uses his smartphone and
home internet service for personal use, say forty percent of the time,
what should be the concomitant tax consequences? Had the employee
independently secured a smartphone, the associated fees would likely
have been at least $100 monthly, or $1200 annually.112 Internet access
can range from $30 to over $300 per month, depending on the speed (up
to $3600 annually).113 Because the employer bears this expense, there
has been an accretion to the employee’s wealth and, accordingly, the
possibility of taxable income.
In trying to ascertain the tax consequences associated with the receipt
of these benefits, their respective business and personal uses should be
considered separately. Consider again the example of an employee who
uses her employer-provided cell phone for personal purposes forty
percent of the time and for work purposes sixty percent of the time. The
portion of the phone expense attributable to work use (i.e., sixty percent
of the total annual cost) should be a nontaxable working condition fringe
benefit under section 132 because if the employee had paid for the work
use directly, she could deduct it as a business expense.114

112. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Verizon Leads Top Wireless Carriers in Bill Size, at Least $148 a
Month, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 15, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/01/verizon-leads-topwireless-carriers-in-bill-size-at-148-a-month [https://perma.cc/F9RK-PM9C] (explaining the
average individual iPhone plan costs $104 per month; average for other smartphones is $94 per
month).
113. See NICK RUSSO ET AL., OPEN TECH. INST., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2014, at 12 fig.1
(2014),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/229-the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/OTI_The_
Cost_of_Connectivity_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L745-85TW]; see also Fung, supra note 88; Yi,
supra note 88.
114. Generally, a taxpayer must provide some evidence showing which portion of a mixed-use
cell phone or internet service was allocable to business activity and may take a business deduction
for that portion. Recently, a taxpayer attempted to deduct his entire cellular phone bill for 2010 of
$2478 despite the fact that he, his wife, and their two children were also on the plan. Kaminski v.
Comm’r, No. 21119-13S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2015-7. He also tried to deduct his $636 internet bill that
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As for the personal portion of the phone or internet use, there are two
possible approaches, one of which is pro-taxpayer and the other of which
is pro-government. Under the pro-taxpayer approach, the personal use of
the phone and internet would constitute a de minimis fringe benefit
because the use is occasional. The IRS has adopted this pro-taxpayer
position in the case of certain employer-provided cell phones (but not
internet service).115 Specifically, the IRS has issued guidance stating that
it will treat the business use of the cell phone as a working condition
fringe and the personal use as a de minimis fringe, as long the phone was
provided for noncompensatory reasons such as ensuring that the
employer or clients can reach the employee outside of normal work
hours.116 The pro-government approach would be to argue that while the
business use of both the telephone and internet service constitutes a
working condition fringe benefit, their frequent personal use combined
with their significant fair market value disqualifies them from
constituting de minimis fringe benefits.117 As such, a percentage of the
fair market value of each item equal to personal use time should be
includable in the employee’s income.118 We explore this approach in
depth in Part III.
3.

Lifestyle Enhancements

Finally, consider the income tax consequences of certain on-the-job
comforts and entertainment such as concierge services, personal
massages, and access to dance lessons and bowling alleys. Had the
employee made such purchases, they would not qualify as ordinary and
necessary business expenses; and, as such, they would not qualify as
working condition fringe benefits.119 Whether these sorts of fringe
provided home access. Id. The Commissioner allowed the taxpayer to deduct seventy-five percent
of the internet cost and twenty-five percent of the phone bill. Id.
Notably, cell phones are no longer subject to the substantiation requirements of Code section
274(d), which contain more onerous recordkeeping requirements for taxpayers to deduct certain
types of business expenses (e.g., business travel and entertainment expenses). Small Business Jobs
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 2043, 124 Stat. 2504, 2560 (removing cell phones from the
definition of “listed property” under Code section 280F(d)(4)).
115. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407 (allowing personal use of a cell phone to
constitute a de minimis fringe benefit as long as the cell phone is primarily noncompensatory in
nature).
116. Id. On the other hand, the notice does not apply to phones offered to promote employee
morale, attract prospective hires, or furnish additional compensation. Id.
117. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
118. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
119. See id. § 132(d).
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benefits can qualify as de minimis is another issue. In some cases, they
should qualify; for example, even if a company regularly offers its
employees cappuccino instead of plain coffee, there is little doubt that
the IRS would classify such a benefit as de minimis.120 In contrast, if a
company regularly offers employees certain other benefits (e.g., haircuts,
dance lessons, or concierge services) that are (1) valuable, (2) frequently
utilized by particular employees, or (3) frequently utilized by a large
segment of the employer’s employees, those benefits will not fall within
the ambit of de minimis fringe benefits exempt from taxation.121
In sum, a close examination of today’s fringe benefit offerings
strongly suggests that the vast majority constitute gross income and that
no exclusion exempts them from taxation.
Admittedly, there is a line of cases in which economic benefits inure
to taxpayers that are not specifically excluded from income under Code
section 132 but are nevertheless deemed not taxable.122 For example, in
United States v. Gotcher,123 an employer sent an employee on a scouting
mission to Germany to determine whether a capital investment in a
Volkswagen franchise was worthwhile. While in Germany, the vast
majority of the employee’s time was apparently spent engaged in
business (i.e., investigating the viability of the franchise purchase), but
the employee also spent part of his trip touring the German
countryside.124 The Fifth Circuit held that these touring junkets
constituted inconsequential economic benefits and, as such, were not
taxable, declaring that “some economic gains, though not specifically
excluded from section 61, may nevertheless escape taxation.”125
But the inconsequential economic benefits involved in Gotcher are
readily distinguishable from the modern fringe benefits described in this
Article. With respect to the benefits described in such cases, the
marginal economic utility that the employees were able to command was
truly an unintended by-product associated with the business objectives

120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that
employer-provided fishing trip did not constitute income to employees because the primary thrust of
the trip was business related); People’s Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
(finding that since the trip’s training aspects predominated its vacation aspects, the economic benefit
that inured to employees did not constitute wages).
123. 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968).
124. See id. at 122.
125. Id. at 124. However, Gotcher was taxed on the value of the trip expenses attributable to his
wife, for whom “the trip was primarily a vacation.” Id.
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that the employer in question sought to achieve.126 In contrast, today’s
modern fringe benefits are, for the most part, wholly unrelated to the
employer’s economic objectives and easily segregated therefrom.
C.

Why Modern Fringe Benefits Are Often Not Reported

Despite the fact that modern fringe benefits (which were largely
unknown until the turn of this century) should be subject to income
tax,127 there are a number of reasons why taxpayers may fail to report
these fringe benefits for tax purposes. Possible factors include the
following: (1) the valuation of such fringe benefits is inherently
problematic; (2) recordkeeping could prove administratively
burdensome; (3) their “tax-free status” has tremendous popular and
political support; and, (4) over the past quarter of a century, payroll taxes
have significantly risen, making noncompliance more attractive. One or
more of these factors likely play a pivotal role in the practice of
taxpayers not reporting the receipt of these benefits.
1.

Problematic Valuation

Consider first the issue of valuation. Taxable benefits are generally
easy to quantify. If a taxpayer performs a service and is paid $1000 in
cash, then the Code taxes the $1000 as income.128 Similarly, if a
taxpayer performs the same services and is paid in-kind (e.g., with a
television worth $1000), the Code taxes the in-kind payment as $1000 of
income.129
Much more challenging are circumstances in which payments are
made in-kind with assets that have a fair market value that is hard or
virtually impossible to ascertain. A case in point is frequent-flier miles.
The fair market value of these miles depends upon a whole host of
important factors, including the generosity of the plan itself (i.e., how
many miles must be redeemed to secure a particular trip), the time in the
126. This issue is somewhat similar in nature to what are known as Kleinwächter’s conundrums,
presented in HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 43 (1938). The most famous of these conundrums involves a
Flügeladjutant, or military attaché, who, as a condition of his employment, must attend the theater
and opera with the emperor. As a result of attending these entertainment events, would the
Flügeladjutant derive income? Simons labeled the answer to this question as “clearly hopeless,” id.
at 53, but this series of cases, see supra note 122, and Gotcher instruct taxpayers to treat the
inconsequential economic benefits deriving from certain employment events as nontaxable.
127. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
128. Id.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003).
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calendar year when the benefit is redeemed, and the proximity in time to
the scheduled flight when the reservation is made.130 Translated into
dollars and cents, several studies indicate a wide disparity in the fair
market value of frequent-flier miles: they are purportedly worth as little
as a penny or as much as a nickel.131 A typical employer would not know
how to pinpoint this value. If an employer assumed the fair market value
of each mile to be one cent, the income of many employees might be
undertaxed; conversely, if an employer assumed the fair market value of
each mile to be five cents, the income of many employees would be
overtaxed. The timing of the inclusion in income is also problematic: is
it upon receipt of the miles, when the reservation is made, or when the
flight is taken?
Many of the issues regarding frequent-flier miles likewise hold true
with respect to the other customer loyalty program benefits that this
analysis describes (e.g., hotel rewards programs and rental car bonus
upgrades)—in other words, ascertaining their fair market values is
fraught with great difficulty, and timing inclusion concerns abound.132
2.

Burdensome Recordkeeping

Next, consider the recordkeeping challenges associated with tracking
the receipt of many modern fringe benefits. By way of background,
consider the fact that the Treasury regulations generally do not require
that taxpayers track the receipt of de minimis fringe benefits if the
burdens of tracking such benefits outweigh their projected revenue.133
The quintessential example of such a de minimis fringe benefit is
attendance at an occasional employer-provided cocktail party; no one
realistically expects that the bartender should record each drink that an
employee orders and, at the end of the event, issue a drink-tally report to
the employer or the employee. The revenue associated with taxing these
drinks would not be worth the administrative recordkeeping burden.

130. See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text.
131. Ed Perkins, Frequent Flyer Miles: A Close Look, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 6, 2013),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-06/lifestyle/sns-201308060000—tms—travelpkctnxfa20130806-20130806_1_1-8-cents-award-seats-premium-seats [https://perma.cc/Z5ZY-HAT9].
132. Consider hotel points, which are frequently subject to restrictions not unlike those applicable
to airline miles. For example, the type of room or upgrade that can be purchased with a certain
amount of points may vary based on availability at the time of purchase, or the time of the year. See,
e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, HILTON HHONORS, http://hhonors3.hilton.com/en/support/faq/
index.html#hotelrewards [https://perma.cc/YWP6-SW9U] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (discussing
restrictions applicable to Hilton hotel points).
133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992).
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Such administrative challenges hold true with respect to many other
fringe benefits as well. For example, with respect to employees who use
their employer-provided cell phones and home internet service for
personal use, it would be intrusive for employers to monitor and
burdensome to employees to record such usage.
3.

Political Support for Tax-Free Status

Today’s fringe benefits also garner tremendous popular and political
support. Such benefits have become ubiquitous and deeply entrenched as
an essential feature of the nation’s economic fabric.
Consider a recent case in point. As a marketing ploy, Citibank offered
potential customers frequent-flier miles if they opened up new deposit
accounts.134 Those taxpayers who, on the basis of this offer, opened bank
accounts and received frequent-flier miles were surprised to learn that
Citibank treated the frequent-flier miles, valued at 2.5 cents per mile, as
a form of taxable interest and reported it on each customer’s annual
Form 1099.135 This tax treatment created a firestorm of controversy as
politicians from both sides of the political aisle rushed to denounce
Citibank’s tax treatment of such miles,136 even though Citibank was on
sound statutory footing.137
The Citibank uproar is not an isolated incident.138 On many occasions,
popular and political support for the current tax treatment of third-partyprovided fringe benefits has been quite vocal.139

134. Martha C. White, Income Taxes on Frequent Flyer Miles?!, TIME (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/01/30/citi-customers-learn-bonus-airline-miles-have-a-high-price/
[https://perma.cc/G83R-NLPR].
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Alistair M. Nevius, Are Frequent Flyer Miles Taxable?, J. ACCT. (July 31, 2012),
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2012/Aug/20125796.htm
[https://perma.cc/F5HEHVCJ] (“Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, wrote Citibank to reprimand it and ask it to discontinue the
practice.”).
137. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
138. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1299–300 (1999) (explaining why many politicians,
reflecting public sentiment, made it clear that record-breaking home-run baseballs should not be
taxed).
A more cynical reason why many politicians are such staunch defenders of retaining the tax-free
status of third-party fringe benefits is that the recipients of such benefits are well-to-do
economically and have used their bountiful financial resources to lobby politicians on their behalf.
See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective
Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (2006) (explaining how politicians use the threat of taxes to attract
campaign funds).
139. See, e.g., JP Mangalindan, A Tax on Free Meals? Silicon Valley Says ‘Bad Idea,’ FORTUNE
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This popular and political support has engendered an environment in
which taxpayers—both employers and employees—exist in self-imposed
ignorance regarding the dispensing and receipt of fringe benefits.
Employers who do not report these kinds of fringe benefits understand
that this is not an issue that IRS auditors generally raise,140 and many
employees subscribe to the notion that they must report only what is on
their Form W-2. The combination of the employer’s mentality that “the
less it tells, the better” and the employees’ mentality that “the less they
know, the better” has left a vast void when it comes to the reporting of
these fringe benefits.
4.

Increased Payroll Taxes

Finally, over the last several years, payroll taxes have become more
burdensome. The two most significant payroll increases were in 1993
and 2010. In 1993, Congress passed legislation that removed the wage
cap associated with the application of the 2.9% Medicare tax141 so that
all wages are now subject to this payroll tax. More recently, as part of
the Affordable Care Act, so-called high-income workers pay an
additional Medicare tax equal to 0.9% of earnings above certain
unindexed thresholds: $200,000 for single taxpayers and $250,000 for
the combined earnings of married taxpayers.142 Offering tax-free fringe
benefits mitigates the burdens of these increased payroll taxes and
thereby enhances their attractiveness.
D.

The Current Landscape

The reasons for taxpayer noncompliance are, quite obviously,
plentiful, which bodes poorly for a tax system that historically relies
(Sept. 2, 2014, 8:25 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/02/a-tax-on-free-meals-silicon-valley-reacts/
[https://perma.cc/3CE3-VWV8] (“News of a potential tax on free meals has many worried in
Silicon Valley, where all-you-can eat buffets are a basic recruiting tool.”).
140. IRS agents harbor a self-interest in not aggressively pursuing taxpayers who receive
promotional benefits and treating them as taxable income since the Internal Revenue Manual
specifically states the following: “Counsel employees may retain for personal use promotional items
received during the course of an official business trip if such items are obtained under the same
conditions as those offered to the general public at no additional cost to the Government.”
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL ¶ 30.5.2.6 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/
irm/part30/irm_30-005-002.html#d0e620 [https://perma.cc/37P7-2PEL].
141. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13207, 107 Stat. 312,
467–68.
142. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9015, 124 Stat. 119,
870–71 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061–63 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (2012)).
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heavily upon accurate taxpayer self-reporting. Thus, it is important to
explore those avenues of reform that Congress should consider in order
to bolster taxpayer compliance.
For many reasons, reforming this area of the law is challenging. For
years, taxpayers have become acclimated to not paying taxes on many
fringe benefits. They and the politicians that represent them are thus
unlikely to readily concede that such benefits are taxable; indeed, they
will likely argue that many hurdles, such as valuation and administrative
recordkeeping, make the taxation of such benefits impossible. This is not
a problem that is unique to the United States, either. Other industrial
countries that rely upon income tax systems for revenue are
encountering the same difficult issue of trying to tax third-partyprovided fringe benefits, and, to date, no such nation has developed an
approach that puts this issue to rest; instead, each appears to endure this
problem in its own stoic fashion.143
For the time being, the IRS has responded to some, though not all, of
these issues in an ad hoc fashion. With respect to frequent-flier miles
and similar promotional benefits earned through business travel, the IRS
has declared that, in the absence of congressional direction, it will not
take any enforcement action against taxpayers who use these benefits for
personal purposes.144 The IRS has also taken the position that personal
use of cell phones provided by employers primarily for business
purposes constitutes a de minimis fringe.145 Finally, though the IRS has
remained silent on the issue of lifestyle enhancements to date, the
Treasury and the IRS have put “[g]uidance under [sections] 119 and 132
regarding employer-provided meals” on their 2014–2015 Priority
Guidance Plan.146
That the IRS has staked out a position with respect to any of these
benefits should leave elected officials from both sides of the political
aisle uneasy. On the right, politicians should be aghast that an unelected
administrative agency—particularly one that they detest147—has been
143. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Up in the Air over Frequent Flyer Benefits: The American,
Canadian, and Australian Experiences, 9 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 420, 421 (2014) (“Virtually no
tax on frequent flyer benefits is collected anywhere, and respect for the rule of law . . . has been
eroded.”).
144. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.
145. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407.
146. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2014–2015 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN 10 (2015),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-2015_pgp_3rd_quarter_update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZDL8N6D].
147. See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Republicans Love to Hate the IRS, but It’s a Model of Efficiency,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0401-mcmanus-irs-
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tacitly permitted to establish de facto law. On the left, politicians should
be aghast that billions of dollars of fringe benefits, inuring
predominantly to the wealthy,148 escape any taxation.
III.

FRINGE BENEFIT TAX REFORM

The solution to fringe benefit tax reform lies in congressional
attention to this matter. This Part looks first at guiding principles that
should assist Congress in formulating reform measures and, second, at
the application of these principles to the specific categories of modern
fringe benefits discussed herein: customer loyalty programs, mixed-use
assets, and lifestyle enhancements.
A.

Guiding Principles

Before discussing potential approaches to taxing specific fringe
benefits, we consider the following guiding principles for reform.
1.

Valuation

First, consider valuation. When valuing fringe benefits is
administratively burdensome and little tax revenue is at stake, such
benefits should be excluded from employees’ income. In those
circumstances, the cost to either the employer or the employee of having
to value the benefit, along with additional administrative cost to the IRS
of enforcing proper valuation, likely outweighs any financial benefit to
the government.
But difficult valuation alone does not justify exempting fringe
benefits from taxation, particularly when there is significant tax revenue
at stake. In such cases, policymakers should require income inclusion
and rely on proxy values or formulas that would be simple and efficient
to administer. Political or fairness concerns about inaccuracy can be
20150401-column.html [https://perma.cc/QYX8-SUBW].
148. See, e.g., Frances Dinkelspiel, With High-End Meal Perks, Facebook Keeps Up Valley
Tradition, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/us/25sfcafeteria.html?
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/66M8-DDB8] (“On one day, the menu may feature Thai-spiced
cilantro chicken or salmon with red curry sauce. On another, there may be roasted quail, a variety of
chocolate-infused treats or the signature dishes of some of the top chefs of New York.”); Rachel
Feintzeig, Lavish Perks Spawn New Job Category, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lavish-perks-spawn-new-job-category-1416529198 [https://perma.cc/
VZN2-HYMD] (“Asana spends tens of thousands of dollars a year per employee on perks, which
[the company’s chief operating officer] says is ‘easily’ equivalent to between 10% and 15% of
salaries. [Pinterest] . . . says it spends $10 to $12 for each employee lunch or dinner—and $10 a
person for the once-a-week hot breakfast.”).
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addressed by choosing proxies or formulas that err toward being
taxpayer friendly. For example, as discussed below, frequent-flyer miles
should be valued at a fixed amount per mile based on a low-end estimate
of their fair market value. Although adopting taxpayer-friendly valuation
rules may leave tax revenue on the table, it is far preferable to exempting
hard-to-value fringes from tax, which not only collects zero revenue but
also reinforces the faulty perception that noncash compensation is free
from tax. The Code taxes hard-to-value property and services in other
contexts,149 and valuable fringe benefits should not be an exception.
2.

Recordkeeping

Next, consider the recordkeeping challenges associated with the
receipt of some fringe benefits. Certain goods or services may be
relatively easy to value but difficult to track. This is particularly true of
benefits with a mixed business/personal element. For example, although
the value of cell phone service provided by a third party is not difficult
to ascertain, tracking an employee’s business versus personal use of the
phone may be difficult. Like valuation, the cost of arduous
recordkeeping may outweigh the benefit of taxing certain benefits if
little tax revenue is at stake. However, for fringe benefits that represent
significant compensation to employees, recordkeeping challenges do not
justify exempting such benefits from tax. In many instances, these
challenges can be overcome by relying on fixed allocations between
business and personal benefits in lieu of tracking employees’ actual
personal consumption. For example, as discussed below, fifty percent of
the value of an employer-provided cell phone could be taxed to
employees as compensation.150
Consider further the fact that certain other fringe benefits may be
difficult to track on an employee-by-employee basis, yet the employer’s
collective costs may be relatively simple to track. For example, an
employer might provide free on-site yoga classes on a weekly basis for
any employee who wishes to participate. While keeping track of which
employees attend yoga week-to-week would be somewhat burdensome,
tracking the employer’s costs for hiring a yoga teacher and providing
facilities would be comparatively simple. In such circumstances,
denying an employer deduction for costs is preferable to taxing

149. For example, regulations under section 482 of the Code provide extensive rules for valuing
intangible property transferred between certain related parties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 (as
amended in 2011).
150. See infra Section III.C.
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employees on the benefit.151
3.

Public Perception/Politics

Another consideration is public perception and politics. While any
attempt to tax fringe benefits that have been largely ignored until now
will be met with marginal resistance, some reforms may be more or less
popular than others. Taxation of benefits that are generally not perceived
to be income by taxpayers, or benefits that taxpayers are unable to opt
out of, will be particularly unpopular. In cases where taxing employees
on certain fringe benefits would be particularly unpalatable,
policymakers should consider denying employer deductions instead.
4.

Information Returns

Finally, in those instances where taxation is warranted and in order to
bolster compliance, we contend that Congress should require
information returns to be provided to fringe benefit recipients. For
benefits offered directly by employers, current withholding and
information-reporting requirements for wages should apply; in the case
of fringe benefits provided by third parties, Congress should require
information reporting by those third parties if they are in the best
position to track and disseminate information regarding the benefits.
Applying the foregoing principles and using our prior
categorizations152—customer loyalty programs, mixed-use goods and
services, and workplace lifestyle enhancements—we explore the
appropriate tax consequences associated with the receipt of each fringe
benefit. Depending upon the nature of the benefit being dispensed, we
determine that they should be (1) included in employee income, (2)
excluded from employee income, or (3) excluded from employee income
coupled with a denial of a deduction for the employer.
B.

Taxing Customer Loyalty Program Benefits
Customer loyalty programs generally should result in their

151. There is, of course, a potential accuracy trade-off that comes with denying an employer
deduction as opposed to taxing benefits at fair market value. For example, employers with net
operating losses or very low effective tax rates would experience little or no impact from losing a
deduction, and there would be little or no associated revenue gain. However, in cases where
tracking employer costs is significantly easier than tracking employee benefits, or where taxing
employees would be politically impracticable, this potential trade-off can be justified.
152. See supra Section II.A.
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participants accruing taxable income153 when, as is commonly the case,
the benefits are earned in the business context and subsequently utilized
for unrelated personal consumption. Customer loyalty points should be
valued based on a fixed amount per point and included in income at the
time that they are redeemed for personal consumption.
We draw this conclusion for several reasons. First, as discussed above
in Part III, customer rewards earned from business travel and redeemed
for personal use clearly constitute gross income to the employee under
the tax law.154 For example, an employee who earns frequent-flier miles
through business travel paid for by her employer, and who later uses
those miles to take a vacation to Hawaii, has clearly realized an
accession to wealth.155 Second, in considering the three options
discussed above (exclude from income, include in income, or deny
employer deduction), income inclusion is most appropriate in this
context. Recordkeeping costs are minimal because airlines, hotels, and
other similar third parties already keep electronic records of customer
loyalty points. Additionally, the revenue at stake is substantial;156 thus,
there is little justification here for an exclusion from income. Finally,
employers do not incur additional out-of-pocket costs157 for customer
loyalty points that their employees accrue, so denying a deduction that
would represent the cost of the benefit is not a viable option.
The biggest challenges presented by customer loyalty programs are
valuation and timing. Consider again the example of an employee who
redeems frequent-flier miles earned through business travel for a flight
to Alabama. To tax her on the benefit received, policymakers must
determine how to value the benefit and when to require the income
inclusion. As to valuation, the “correct” result under the tax law would
be to tax the employee on the fair market value of the airline ticket that
she purchased with her frequent-flier miles.158 However, determining

153. An exception is office supply coupons, which should be excluded from taxation, as
discussed further below.
154. On the other hand, redeeming points earned through personal travel paid for by the taxpayer
would not result in taxable income. See supra note 68.
155. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
156. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Zelenak estimates forgone revenue from not
taxing frequent-flier benefits to be in the range of $1.5 billion per year. Zelenak, supra note 143, at
2.
157. It is possible that the value of customer loyalty points is built into the price of the services
that generate those points, but determining what portion of that value is assignable to the points is
impractical. Generally, the market price of a service with or without customer loyalty membership
is the same.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003).
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this fair market value may be difficult with respect to an individual ticket
and, even if this fair market value could be determined with reasonable
accuracy, adopting a case-by-case valuation would be administratively
costly.
One option that would attempt to approximate fair market valuation
of frequent-flier miles would be to tax the employee on an amount equal
to the cost of a comparable airline ticket purchased for cash, i.e., a ticket
on the same flight that is in the same class (economy versus business, for
example) and that is subject to the same restrictions.159 In theory, an
airline might be able to provide this value with relative ease using a
computer program. However, it is likely that, in most cases, comparable
tickets do not exist160: tickets purchased with frequent-flier miles tend to
be subject to more restrictions than tickets purchased for cash, and
tickets with more restrictions are generally cheaper than unrestricted
tickets or tickets with fewer restrictions.161 Thus, even the most heavily
discounted economy fare is likely worth more than an economy class
ticket purchased with frequent-flier miles. Additionally, even if airlines
could provide the value of a comparable ticket relatively simply, the
process of having to value rewards points on a flight-by-flight basis
might be too burdensome to justify the cost.
Treasury regulations applicable to airline employees suggest another
approach to valuing “free” flights.162 Under the relevant rules, airline
159. A comparable approach was taken by the Tax Court of Canada in Mommersteeg v. The
Queen, 96 D.T.C. 1011 (1995). See also Zelenak, supra note 143, at 428–29 (discussing
Mommersteeg). In Mommersteeg, the taxpayers had used frequent-flier miles earned through
business travel to purchase airline tickets. 96 D.T.C. at 1011–12. The court held that, ideally, the
“reward tickets” should be valued at the price of a ticket on the same flight in the same class and
subject to the same restrictions. Id. at 1016. However, the reward tickets on the relevant flights were
heavily restricted, while first and business class tickets purchased for cash were unrestricted. Id. at
1016–17. Thus, the court discounted the amount includable in income, holding that “the value of a
reward ticket in either business or first class is equal to that proportion of an unrestricted business or
first class fare which the price of the most heavily discounted economy class fare on that flight is of
the price of a full fare economy class ticket.” Id. at 1017. Zelenak notes that the Canadian Revenue
Agency has generally not made any attempt to enforce the taxability of frequent-flier miles
subsequent to the decision in Mommersteeg. Zelenak, supra note 143, at 429 (“Despite the
[Canadian Revenue Authority’s (CRA)] judicial victory, there is no indication that the CRA is
making any meaningful attempt to enforce the taxability of frequent flyer rewards.”).
160. See Mommersteeg, 96 D.T.C. at 1014; George Guttman, IRS Moves Slowly on Frequent
Flyer Issue, 38 TAX NOTES 1309, 1312 (1988); Zelenak, supra note 143, at 429.
161. See, e.g., Mommersteeg, 96 D.T.C. at 1014 (“Restrictions may relate to the time when the
ticket must be issued, flexibility of travel, for example, advance booking requirements and the
ability to change the itinerary, the availability of refund if a ticket is not used, length of stay at
destination and season in which travel is to take place. A major restriction relates to the number of
tickets made available at each price level.”).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(h) (as amended in 2012).
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employees who fly standby (free of charge) on certain commercial
flights are taxed on twenty-five percent of the airline’s highest
unrestricted coach fare for that flight.163 It is unclear how this approach
to valuation would relate to an ideal fair market value for a ticket
purchased with frequent-flier miles.164 On the one hand, limiting the
valuation to twenty-five percent of the coach fare may result in
undervaluation. On the other hand, basing the calculation on an
unrestricted fare might overvalue a highly restricted ticket purchased
with frequent-flier miles, even with the seventy-five percent discount. In
any case, application of this Treasury rule (which generally applies in
very limited circumstances)165 requires the administratively burdensome
task of determining the highest unrestricted coach fare for each relevant
flight.
A far better approach is to simply place a flat dollar value on each
“mile” or “point” earned through a customer loyalty program. For
example, each frequent-flier mile might be valued at one cent initially166
and adjusted periodically for inflation.167 Customer loyalty points for
other types of programs like hotels or rental cars could be valued in a
similar manner. While no single value would accurately capture the fair
market value of each kind of benefit, the simplicity of choosing a flat
amount justifies such an approach. To avoid fairness concerns
surrounding overtaxing employees, policymakers should choose an
amount on the low-end of the estimated value range. Thus, one cent per
mile would likely undervalue many frequent-flier benefits, which have

163. Id. § 1.61-21(h)(1).
164. Id. The amount is includable on the date that the flight is taken. Id. § 1.61-21(h)(4).
165. Standby flights offered by airlines to their employees are generally excludable fringe
benefits under section 132 as long as the benefit qualifies as a “no-additional-cost service” (e.g., the
flight was not otherwise full and thus there is no forgone revenue). See BLOOMBERG BNA, TAX
MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS: EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS, NO. 394-5TH, at A-23. The valuation
rule under Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(h) generally applies to no-additional-cost services offered to airline
employees by an airline other than the employee’s employer, which otherwise would not qualify
under section 132. Id. at A-68.
166. Zelenak suggests a valuation in the range of $0.008 to $0.010 per mile. See Zelenak, supra
note 143, at 441. The valuation of frequent-flier miles may reach new levels of obscurity. See Ron
Lieber, Guesswork in Cashing in Delta’s Frequent-Flier Miles, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/your-money/in-deltas-frequent-flier-magic-trick-not-justrabbits-disappear.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/U4ZA-59RG] (explaining how the number of miles
needed for a free ticket or upgrade under Delta’s reengineered rewards program “will change based
on destination, demand and other considerations”).
167. Like tax bracket dollar thresholds and the amount of the personal exemption and standard
deduction, valuations could be adjusted annually via the Treasury and the IRS rather than through
the legislative process.
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been estimated to be valued between one and six cents per mile,168 but
such a valuation would still generate revenue—and in a politically
palatable way. In addition to revenue generation, taxing rewards points
at even a minimal value could go a long way toward restoring IRS
credibility and promoting taxpayer compliance.
As for the timing of the income inclusion, there is a theoretical case to
be made for taxing employees upon the receipt of the miles or points. A
taxpayer who has earned points or miles redeemable for valuable
benefits has arguably satisfied all the tests for income inclusion under
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,169 i.e., an accession to wealth that
is clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete dominion.170
On the other hand, rewards points like frequent-flier miles are generally
subject to contractual limitations that may point toward no income
realization event before they are actually redeemed.171 In any event, it is
likely that taxpayers generally do not perceive that they have received a
benefit from the accrual of customer loyalty points until those points are
redeemed. For many individuals, points or miles may expire before they
are used. For others, restrictions on flights like blackout dates may make
miles practicably unusable, while other employees may have no desire to
use points earned through business travel for personal purposes.
However, when a customer redeems miles or points in exchange for
something of value (an airline ticket, for example), the benefit to the
taxpayer is clear. To avoid perceptions of unfairness and political
backlash, policymakers should establish that customer loyalty points are
includable in income at the time that they are redeemed.
Taxing rewards points at a flat dollar amount upon redemption would
present some logistical hurdles, but these hurdles are not
insurmountable. Consider again the case of frequent-flier miles, and
assume, for example, that an employee earned 50,000 miles through
work trips paid for by her employer. Further assume that she earned
20,000 miles on personal trips that she paid for herself, bringing her total
frequent-flier miles to 70,000. If the employee redeems 30,000 miles to
purchase a round-trip coach ticket to Hawaii for vacation, who should be
responsible for tracking miles that she accrues on business trips?
Furthermore, how should those miles be tracked?
168. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
169. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
170. Id. at 477.
171. For example, Zelenak notes that airlines’ frequent-flier programs typically contain terms and
conditions that allow the airline to change or revoke benefits without notice. See Zelenak, supra
note 143, at 437.
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Among the employee, her employer, and the airline, the airline is in
the best position by far to track the frequent-flier miles. As part of its
rewards program, airlines already have the capacity to electronically
track miles accrued for each customer, and, thus, no significant
additional costs would be incurred. As for employers, they lack the
necessary information regarding taxpayers’ customer rewards
accounts.172 And while the taxpayers themselves are privy to the
necessary information and could keep their own records, compliance is
demonstrably lower when there is no third-party reporting.173
Accordingly, the airlines themselves are the best choice to ensure tax
compliance.174
Assuming that airlines (or the corresponding rewards provider) would
be responsible for tracking taxable miles, separating business and
personal miles could be accomplished by requiring customers to
indicate, for each trip booked, whether the travel was for “business” or
“personal” reasons. For example, when a customer books a flight online
using the airline’s website, he generally is prompted to enter his
frequent-flier number. He could be similarly prompted to make one
additional entry by checking a box or choosing from a pull-down menu
to indicate whether the trip was business or personal in nature.
Once miles were separated into personal and business accounts, there
would need to be a system for allocating miles redeemed for trips. For
the same reasons that policymakers should choose a low valuation for
taxing frequent-flier miles, they might similarly adopt a taxpayerfriendly approach of allowing personal miles to be applied toward
redemption before business miles. In the example above, this would
mean that our employee would be treated as having redeemed 20,000
personal miles and 10,000 business miles for her ticket to Hawaii.
Accordingly, she would be taxed on $100 of income (10,000 x $0.01).
Airlines could then send to taxpayers annual statements on Form 1099
172. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 160, at 1313.
173. See, e.g., Karen Setze, Taxpayers Honest When Someone’s Checking, Say IRS Officials, 111
TAX NOTES 1216, 1216 (2006) (“[R]esults from the recently completed individual reporting
compliance study for 2001 . . . showed that only 1.2 percent of wage income was underreported, 57
percent of nonfarm proprietor income was misreported . . . and 72 percent of farm income was
misreported.”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006: OVERVIEW, at chart 1
(2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/EHL7V3KV] (estimating one percent noncompliance rate when income is subject to substantial
information reporting and withholding, and eight percent noncompliance rate when income is
subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding).
174. See Joseph M. Dodge, How to Tax Frequent Flyer Bonuses, 48 TAX NOTES 1301, 1302–03
(1990) (proposing that airlines send taxpayers information returns with aggregate numbers (e.g.,
total award miles used) with the burden on taxpayers to calculate taxable income).
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reporting how many business miles had been redeemed during the year
and the corresponding amount of taxable income.175
Although a shift in the status quo with respect to taxing customer
loyalty programs may be met with some resistance initially, taxpayers
will still recognize savings from rewards points, and it is highly unlikely
that the tax paid would be greater than the amount at which they value
the benefit. In the above example, the employee taxpayer recognizes
$100 of income upon redemption of miles for a ticket to Hawaii.
Assuming that her marginal tax rate is thirty percent, her cost for the
ticket is now $30 (instead of zero), which is likely still significantly less
expensive than the amount for which she could purchase a flight for
cash. And if cash prices for a flight somehow dropped below the
employee’s “cost”176 of a taxed flight, she could opt to pay cash instead
of using frequent-flier miles. This is the same calculus that many
individuals undoubtedly make when deciding whether to purchase
relatively cheap flights for cash instead of using frequent-flier miles
under the current system.
Another issue that is somewhat unique to customer loyalty programs
concerns withholding and payroll taxes. Under current law, employers
are generally subject to withholding and payroll tax obligations on
taxable fringe benefits.177 The issue with these benefits, of course, is that
the remuneration arguably does not come from the employer but, rather,
from the third party. This makes it somewhat unclear whether these
benefits actually constitute “wages” for withholding and payroll tax
purposes.178 Employers have a lot at stake if they fail to account
175. See Guttman, supra note 160, at 1313 (noting that the IRS has taken the position that it has
authority to require airlines to file information reports if the value of the award is at least $600);
Zelenak, supra note 143, at 444 (arguing that Code section 6041(a) authorizes a requirement for
airlines to report frequent-flier miles to taxpayers).
Under current law, information reporting obligations generally are not triggered for payments
under $600 (except as otherwise provided by statute). I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012). Thus, airlines would
not have to report taxable business miles that resulted in less than $600 of income. If a low
valuation per mile is adopted along with a rule that lets taxpayers use personal miles first, this could
effectively exempt a significant number of flights from reporting (as well as exempting other
customer loyalty benefits). Accordingly, policymakers should consider instituting a lower reporting
threshold for third-party-provided fringe benefits, as it has done for other types of income. See, e.g.,
id. § 6049(a) (setting a $10 threshold for interest payments).
176. The cost to the taxpayer would be the cost per mile (e.g., one cent) multiplied by business
miles redeemed multiplied by the employee’s marginal tax rate.
177. Employer withholding and payroll tax obligations extend to “wages,” defined as all
remuneration for services “including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in
any medium other than cash.” I.R.C. §§ 3401(a), 3501(b) (withholding); see also id. §§ 3121(a),
3306(b) (Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal Unemployment Tax Act).
178. Commentators have come out both ways on this issue. Compare Dodge, supra note 174, at
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accurately for the associated tax consequences. A multilevel set of
penalties applies when there is a withholding failure,179 and another set
of penalties applies if accurate information returns are not issued.180
Thus, any legislative action that clarifies the taxability of customer
rewards benefits should similarly clarify employer obligations in this
regard.
As discussed above, employers lack the requisite information
regarding customer loyalty programs to engage in information reporting
or withholding.181 Although policymakers could impose a requirement
that taxpayers keep their employers informed of business-related
rewards, this would be costly182 and likely subject to abuse.183 A better
option would be to treat taxable customer loyalty program points like
interest or dividends—amounts that are subject to information reporting
but not withholding or payroll taxes. In this case, the information
reporting would come from the airlines (or a similar third-party service
provider), and the employers would essentially be left out of the
equation. Thus, taxpayers would report and pay income tax on amounts
reported to them on a Form 1099 by the airline or other relevant third
party. Although there would be some revenue lost to the fisc in the form
of forgone payroll taxes, this may be a worthy sacrifice to the goal of
administrative feasibility.184 Furthermore, information reporting alone,
without withholding, appears to be sufficient to motivate compliance for

1304 (concluding that frequent-flier miles are not wages because “the benefit comes from the
airline, not the employer, and is not earned as compensation for services provided to the
employer”), with Zelenak, supra note 143, at 442 (arguing that airline miles constitute wages
because the employer pays for the travel giving rise to the miles and has “the power either to require
employees to use their points only on business travel or to prohibit employees from seeking to
receive points for employer-paid travel”).
179. Employers that are derelict in their responsibilities to withhold bear the following possible
consequences: secondary liability for failure to withhold income taxes, I.R.C. § 3403; secondary
liability for failure to withhold the employee’s share of FICA taxes, id. § 3102(b); liability for late
deposits on withheld taxes, id. § 6656(a); and liability for accuracy-related penalties, id. § 6662.
180. See id. §§ 6721, 6722.
181. See Dodge, supra note 174.
182. Requiring employees to track rewards earned from business travel and report them to the
employers would be a time-consuming exercise that would largely negate the benefit of shifting
information-reporting responsibilities to the airlines.
183. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 143, at 443.
184. Certainly, some amount of horizontal equity would be compromised as well because income
earned in the form of customer loyalty points would not be subject to payroll taxes while cash
income (and other fringe benefits) would. However, in the case of highly paid employees, payroll
taxes make up only a minor percentage of total taxes paid, so imposing income tax on third-partyprovided fringe benefits would still go a long way toward imposing a fairer system.
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the vast majority of taxpayers,185 so the lack of withholding should not
have any significant negative effect on overall compliance.
While the foregoing discussion has focused largely on frequentflier miles, other similar types of customer loyalty programs like hotel
and rental car programs should be taxed in the same manner. Benefits
from those programs involve the same valuation difficulties, particularly
because redeeming hotel or car rental points may also be subject to
restrictions, making the cash price for a comparable service hard if not
impossible to identify. Thus, a low-end fixed value should be assigned to
each point, and taxpayers should be taxed upon redemption. Like
airlines, providers of other, similar benefits should be required to issue
information returns.
Office supply coupons, on the other hand, should be taxed differently
than other types of customer rewards programs. Admittedly, these store
coupons typically delineate a specific dollar amount and, thus, do not
present nettlesome valuation difficulties. For example, if an employee
purchases $100 of office supplies (for which she is reimbursed by her
employer) at Staples, she might receive a $10 coupon toward her next
Staples purchase. However, while companies like Staples may keep
track of cash rewards through online customer accounts,186 delineating
between business and personal purchases in this context would be
inherently problematic, particularly since those rewards are far more
likely to be redeemed by customers in person. In the context of an instore purchase, tracking the redemption of those coupons, separating
business versus personal coupons, and reporting tax information to
customers is a much more complicated task than tracking frequent-flier
miles and redemption of customer loyalty points of similar businesses,
which in most cases is done online. Further, having a store clerk
ascertain whether a taxpayer’s purchase of a desk chair using a rewards
coupon is for personal or business use would be ridiculous; and relying
upon a taxpayer’s self-serving assessment in this context may result in a
highly suspect judgment call. In light of these administrative difficulties,
we concede that office supply coupons (and other, similar cash coupon
programs) earned through business purchases should be exempt from
taxation for employees who redeem them for personal use. Since the
benefits of these purchases do not fall within the scope of any of the
185. While the noncompliance rate for income subject to both information reporting and
withholding is one percent, the rate for income that is subject to substantial information reporting
only (and not withholding) is just eight percent, indicating that the vast majority of such income is
reported accurately. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 173, chart 1.
186. See Staples Rewards Program, supra note 77.
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statutory exclusions in section 132 of the Code,187 however,
congressional action is needed here to establish such an exemption.188
Although, for reasons of administrative convenience, employees
should not be taxed on the receipt of office supply coupons that they
may use to make purchases that are personal in nature, we recommend
that employers’ deductions for office supply expenses that generate
personal-use coupons for employees be limited. More specifically, we
propose that the employer deduction for office supplies or similar
purchases be limited by a small amount, such as ninety-five percent of
the cost, whenever such expenditures generate rewards coupons
redeemable for personal use by employees.189 For example, if an
employee were to purchase $100 of office supplies at Staples with a
corporate credit card and were to earn a $10 coupon that he could use for
any purpose he wished, his employer would be allowed to deduct only
$95 for the office supplies. Denying a portion of the employer’s
deduction effectively imposes a small surrogate tax on the employer for
the benefit inuring to the employee.190
Employers who wish to deduct 100% of the cost should be able to
“opt out” by eliminating personal use of rewards coupons. For example,
an employer could institute a policy that all rewards coupons earned
through purchases on a corporate credit card or with reimbursed
employee funds must be applied toward future business purchases.191 In
187. Even a coupon with a small face value (e.g., five dollars) would likely not qualify as a de
minimis fringe under section 132 because it is “cash equivalent” and therefore presents no valuation
difficulties. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(c) (as amended in 1992).
188. One alternative would thus be for legislators to amend section 132 and provide for a specific
exemption for cash coupon programs. Another option would be for legislators to amend section
132(e) to provide that rewards coupons qualify as de minimis fringe benefits, although this may
encourage taxpayers to assert that other easy-to-value benefits should be similarly treated. A final
option would be to amend Code section 102 and provide that the coupons constitute tax-free gifts to
the employee. While section 102(a) generally exempts gifts from income tax, current section 102(c)
specifies that this exemption does not apply to gifts made to employees by employers. Thus,
legislators would need to amend section 102(c) to carve out the receipt of cash rewards coupons
accorded by third-party vendors.
189. Congress could amend section 274 of the Code to provide for the ninety-five percent
deduction limitation in this context. If rewards coupons were treated as excludable employee gifts
under section 102(a), see supra note 188, then the ninety-five percent limitation might be added to
Code section 274(b), which currently limits deductions for business gifts to twenty-five dollars.
(The proposed deduction limitation would also technically apply to sole proprietors claiming a
business deduction for their own office supplies; admittedly, in this context, its application would be
more difficult for the IRS to enforce.)
190. See generally Jay A. Soled, Surrogate Taxation and the Second-Best Answer to the In-Kind
Benefit Valuation Riddle, 2012 BYU L. REV. 153.
191. It is important to note that with respect to other expenditures that give rise to customer
loyalty rewards (e.g., airline tickets, hotel rooms, and rental car purchases), a similar approach may
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that case, there would be no personal benefit to the employee, and the
employer should be allowed a full business deduction for the expense.
C.

Taxing Mixed-Use Assets

Employer-provided internet service and cell phone use are currently
enjoyed free of tax consequences by many employees.192 This situation
should not continue: a portion of the benefit representing personal
consumption should be taxed to the employee. That portion should be
determined by applying a fixed ratio to the total cost of the service, with
an opt-out option available under specified conditions for employees.
We draw this conclusion for several reasons.
First, like the use of customer loyalty rewards for personal travel, the
receipt of free cell phone and/or internet access for personal use is
clearly an accession to wealth that represents income. However, in
contrast to customer loyalty rewards, valuation is not necessarily an
issue for mixed-use assets. Consider an employer-provided cell phone
that is offered by the employer for business reasons but that comes with
no restrictions on personal use. Assume, as is typical, that the cell phone
service contract provides for either unlimited calls or a high volume of
minutes for a flat monthly fee, say $100 per month. At the end of the
month, an accounting of all of the employee’s personal calls versus
business calls would reveal the ratio of personal time to total time spent
using the phone. It seems logical, therefore, to assume that the ratio
could simply be applied to the $100 fee to determine the monthly
personal benefit to the employee. The same approach could be used for
internet service as well.
However, the ease of valuing personal versus business use of mixeduse assets is slightly simplified in the above hypothetical. For example,
some cell phone plans bundle services, so allocating costs among
various features like phone calls, text, and data usage might be difficult.
Consider a hypothetical cell phone plan that offers 500 minutes of
calling time plus unlimited text messages for $100 per month. If an
employee spends 200 minutes of time on work calls, 200 minutes on
personal calls, and sends 50 personal text messages, how much of the
$100 is allocated to personal use? What about an employee who spends
10 minutes of time on work calls and makes no personal calls but sends
500 personal text messages? Thus, depending on the bundling of various
be taken: absent the employer eliminating personal use of such benefits, the amount deductible
would be limited.
192. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 7, at 22, tbl.D-1.
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services, allocation issues might exist.
The bigger hurdle for mixed-use assets, however, is recordkeeping.
Even assuming a relatively simple fee structure (e.g., $100 per month for
phone calls only), making a monthly accounting of business versus
personal calls constitutes a rather onerous requirement for a taxpayer.
Without some kind of automated tracking system in place,193 employees
would either have to keep detailed logs or parse through their monthly
bill to separate business and personal time. Employees may keep poor
records and inadvertently make mistakes; or, worse, they may
intentionally underreport personal use to their employers. Placing the
burden on employers to track business versus personal use would be
costly for the employer, and employees may view this as an invasion of
their privacy.
To avoid these recordkeeping costs, in addition to the potential
allocation issues in bundled service plans, policymakers should tax
employees on a fixed percentage of the cost of mixed-use assets like
smartphones. One option would be to adopt a 50/50 allocation,
essentially assuming that the asset is used for personal purposes half of
the time. This is similar to the approach that Congress adopted in section
274, which effectively treats business meals as having a 50/50
business/personal allocation.194 Another option, which may be more
politically palatable, is to adopt a more taxpayer-friendly approach and
skew the allocation toward business use, e.g., 80/20. In the case of such
an allocation, a taxpayer whose employer provided her a cell phone with
unlimited calls and texts for a cost (to the employer) of $100 per month
would be taxed on $20 per month.195 The employer would report the
193. It is possible, however, that mobile applications could be used to automatically track
business calls and provide summary information at the end of each month. Mobile apps today can
track anything from how many times a user unlocks her phone during the day to the number of
minutes spent on a particular website like Facebook. See Katy Hall, These Apps Help You Realize
How Much Time You Waste on Your Phone, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/05/apps-smartphone-use-_n_6096748.html
[https://perma.cc/ELC6-7BEK].
194. Section 274 accomplishes this by limiting the deduction to the employer to fifty percent of
the meal’s cost, however, rather than taxing the employee. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012).
195. Note that the fair market value of a fringe benefit is equal to the amount that the employee
would have to pay for the service in an arm’s-length transaction, and the employer’s cost is not
determinative. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(2) (as amended in 2012); see also I.R.S. Notice 200946, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-23_IRB/ar07.html [https://perma.cc/SVJ2SXK9]. In the case of cell phone service, the employer’s cost might be less than the employee’s
potential cost, particularly if the employer takes advantage of a group discount, which would result
in slight undervaluation of the benefit to the employee. This undervaluation is not a bad result if a
taxpayer-friendly approach is desired, but it may also justify using a 50/50 allocation between
business and personal use rather than a more favorable 80/20 allocation.
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income as additional wages on her pay stub and W-2 and withhold tax.
Adopting a fixed allocation should result in minimal costs for the
employer and zero administrative costs for the employee. The employer
already has access to the information regarding the cost of phone or
internet access provided to its employees,196 and applying a fixed ratio
and adding it to monthly wages would be relatively simple.
Employees may object on the ground that a fixed allocation overtaxes
them, particularly if they spend little personal time on employerprovided devices or if they would have otherwise purchased a cheaper
plan for themselves. However, neither of these concerns carries much
weight. First, employees should be able to opt out of mixed-use assets.
In other words, if an employer provides a cell phone for business
purposes, employees who wish to keep a separate cell phone for personal
purposes197 should be able to agree with their employer that the
employer-provided phone will be used for business purposes only.198
Such employees should not be subject to tax on their employer-provided
phone.199 Second, it seems unlikely that paying tax on a portion of an
employer-provided plan would be more costly than purchasing one’s
own separate plan. Consider again an employee whose employer
provides her with a smartphone that costs $100 per month, and assume
she is treated as having $50 of income per month from the phone service
under a 50/50 allocation. Assuming a marginal tax rate of thirty percent,
the employee’s monthly cost for the personal use of her phone would be

196. Even in the case of a service plan that provides service to numerous phones at an aggregate
cost to the employer (akin to a personal “family plan”), employers should be able to prorate that
cost among the number of phones provided with relative ease.
197. This might not be uncommon. For example, many employees may wish to keep personal
communications separate for privacy reasons.
198. This would likely impose some additional administrative cost because, presumably,
employers would have to periodically audit employee use or have a system to otherwise verify that
the phone was not being used for personal purposes. This also leaves open the possibility of abuse
by employees who might intentionally misrepresent that they will only use their employer-provided
phone for business purposes. Employers could require employees to show proof of their own
personal service contract (e.g., a monthly bill for the employee’s personal cell phone) as a condition
of avoiding tax withholding, but this would not help the individual who does not wish to use a cell
phone for personal purposes at all.
The IRS and Treasury proposed a similar approach in I.R.S. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B 1069.
Under the proposal, cell phone use would not be taxed if employers restricted usage to minimal
personal use. All of the employee’s use would be deemed to be business use if he could provide to
his employer “sufficient records to establish that the employee maintains and uses a personal (nonemployer-provided) cell phone for personal purposes.” Id.
199. A cell phone provided for business use only would be an excludable working condition
fringe benefit under section 132(d).
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$15.200 She is still likely to come out ahead economically in this
scenario, as it is unlikely that she could purchase her own personal plan
at a cheaper cost.
The fact that the tax on mixed-use assets would be withheld
periodically makes income inclusion a particularly attractive policy
choice in this context. Including relatively small amounts of income in
an employee’s paycheck each month and withholding tax would likely
make the regime less psychologically painful for employees, who may
not even notice a slightly smaller paycheck. As compared to taxing other
types of fringe benefits, taxing mixed-use assets may therefore be met
with less political resistance.
The parallels between mixed-use assets and business meals may
suggest that an approach comparable to Code section 274 should be
taken in the context of mixed-use assets, but a close examination shows
that this is not the case. Rather, taxing employees on mixed-use assets
but allowing them to opt out is a more sensible approach.
Like mixed-use assets, business meals paid for by an employer
involve both a business element and a personal benefit. Section 274(n)
addresses this issue by denying the employer a deduction for fifty
percent of the cost of business meals, while the employee does not have
income from receipt of the meal.201 The result is a form of surrogate
taxation, which effectively taxes a portion of the employee benefit by
denying the deduction to the employer. Because the business and
personal elements of a meal cannot be separated, employers have little
choice but to bear the cost of the meal with a limited deduction.202
However, in the case of mixed-use assets, the business and personal
elements can be separated. If employers were denied a deduction for
some portion of the cost of unrestricted-use cell phones and/or internet
service, it is likely that many would respond by simply restricting the
use of the assets to business only.203 Consider again the employerprovided cell phone that costs $100 per month for unlimited calls and
texts. The out-of-pocket cost to the employer is the same regardless of
whether it lets the employee make personal calls on the phone; but if the
employer were denied a deduction and thus chose to restrict the use of
the phone to business only, the cost would be fully deductible. It is,
200. 30% x $50 income = $15 tax.
201. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012).
202. Presumably, employers will only pay for meals that have a business benefit that exceeds the
cost of the meal, taking into account the limited deduction.
203. The cost of cell phones and internet access restricted to business use only would be fully
deductible under section 162. Id. § 162.
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therefore, sensible for an employer to only offer phones or internet
access with restricted use.204
The problem with this scenario is that an employee whose employer
provides a restricted-use cell phone would be forced to maintain a
separate phone for personal purposes. The employee might pay $100 per
month for the same plan that the employer provides, resulting in $200
per month in total costs for duplicative services and no additional tax
revenue to the federal government. This expenditure would constitute a
deadweight loss to the economy. The best solution, therefore, would be
to allow a full deduction for employers but to tax employees on the
mixed-use assets, with an option to opt out if they chose to purchase
their own cell phone and/or internet service instead of using the business
technology for personal use.
Taxing a fixed portion of mixed-use assets is a departure from the
IRS’s current approach with respect to employer-provided cell phones,
which is to treat most personal use as a nontaxable de minimis fringe
benefit.205 However, treating free personal cell phone service as a de
minimis fringe does not comport with the modern realities of cell phone
use. Recall that a de minimis fringe benefit is one with a value so small,
taking into account frequency, that accounting for it would be
“unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”206 While occasional
cocktail parties and holiday gifts are de minimis fringe benefits, season
tickets to sporting events and daily commuting use of an employerprovided car are not.207 Having daily and possibly unlimited access to a
free cell phone is more akin to having daily use of a car or regular seats
at a baseball game than it is to an occasional meal or cocktail party. The
vast majority of individuals today own a cell phone,208 and having one’s

204. Employers might restrict internet access by requiring login through an employer-provided
portal that limits the user to particular websites. There are also a number of software programs that
block specific websites and applications, which can limit personal use of employer-provided
devices. See, e.g., Barracuda Web Security Gateway, BARRACUDA, https://www.barracuda.com/
products/websecuritygateway [https://perma.cc/CQ96-52LG] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Web
Filtering Software — Block Internet Access, BROWSECONTROL, http://www.browsecontrol.com/
web-filtering/ [https://perma.cc/HP2Y-4HUP] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
205. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Although the IRS capitulated in 2011, two years
prior it issued a notice seeking public comments on several proposals to tax personal use of
employer-provided cell phones. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068,
https://www.irs.gov/irb/2009-23_IRB/ar07.html [https://perma.cc/SVJ2-SXK9] (“[T]o the extent
the employee uses the employer’s cell phone for personal purposes, the fair market value of such
usage is includable in the employee’s gross income.”).
206. I.R.C. § 132(e).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2) (as amended in 1992).
208. Cell Phone and Smartphone Ownership Demographics, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET, SCI. &
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employer bear financial responsibility for this service is a regular and
financially significant benefit.209
The fact that an individual employee may only occasionally use an
employer-provided cell phone for personal use does not change the
nature of the benefit. An individual who wishes to maintain even a barebones personal cell phone plan will likely have to pay at least $60 per
month,210 and it is likely that most employer-provided phones offer even
greater benefits than a bare-bones plan. A free monthly gym
membership offered by an employer is a taxable fringe benefit211 even if
the employee never goes to the gym or visits just once a month.
Presumably, an employee whose sporadic use of the gym did not justify
the tax burden would opt out of the membership altogether. Similarly, as
noted above, employees who do not want to use their work phones for
personal purposes can opt out of a mixed-use phone. But the reality is
that most employees with employer-provided devices likely take
advantage of this significant and valuable benefit, and the freedom to do
so is still there for those who do not. This is yet another example of a
benefit that highly compensated employees can currently enjoy free of
tax consequences.
D.

Taxing Workplace Lifestyle Enhancements

Workplace lifestyle enhancements (e.g., free dance lessons or yoga
classes) do not fall within the ambit of working condition fringe benefits
or de minimis fringe benefits and therefore should be taxable to
employees. In fact, under current law, some lifestyle enhancement fringe
benefits, such as free on-site meals provided to promote goodwill or
morale in the workplace, are currently includable in employees’
income.212 However, due to administrative constraints, taxing employees
directly on the economic value of such benefits is far from ideal.

TECH,
http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/mobile/cell-phone-and-smartphone-ownershipdemographics/ [https://perma.cc/XD42-6PAA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (reporting that ninety
percent of American adults own a cell phone and sixty-four percent own a smartphone).
209. For example, the annual cost to maintain a smartphone is generally at least $1200. See
Brodkin, supra note 112.
210. The average cost of a cell phone that is not a smartphone is estimated to be $63 per month,
while a smartphone costs around $100. Brodkin, supra note 112.
211. Section 132 excludes from taxation the use of on-site gyms but not employer-provided
memberships at health clubs. I.R.C. § 132(j)(4); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (stating that
athletic club membership is not a de minimis fringe benefit regardless of frequency with which
employee uses the facility).
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1985).
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Therefore, the best solution is a form of surrogate taxation in which
Congress would deny employers’ deductibility of such purchases.
A comparison of workplace lifestyle enhancements to other types of
fringe benefits, from both the employer’s perspective and the
employee’s perspective, highlights the details of why denying
employers’ deductibility is the best solution for taxation of lifestyle
enhancements.
From the employer’s perspective, lifestyle enhancements, unlike
customer loyalty rewards, involve costs that are borne directly by the
employer; thus, denying a deduction is a viable option here. Further, as
compared to mixed-use assets, the nature of lifestyle enhancements is
fundamentally different. More specifically, while a mixed-use asset such
as a cell phone would commonly be offered for noncompensatory
business purposes from the employer’s perspective (e.g., to reach the
employee at night and on weekends), lifestyle enhancements such as
dance lessons are generally compensatory in nature. The former has an
incidental personal benefit motivated by the employer’s own business
needs; the focal point of the latter is to enhance personal satisfaction,
with the motivating intent to promote morale, attract and retain talent,
and facilitate long hours at the workplace.213
There are fundamental differences from the employee’s perspective,
as well, that should inform the choice of policy. For most employees, an
employer-provided cell phone that can be used for personal purposes
eliminates a cost for service that the employee would otherwise incur.
Mixed-use assets like cell phones and internet service are so commonly
used that it is unlikely that a significant number of employees would be
forced to consume services that they would not otherwise consume in
their personal lives. But this is not necessarily true of workplace lifestyle
enhancements. Consider an employer who provides on-site massages or
free dance lessons. Would an employee otherwise consume those
services? The answer is not as clear in this case. Some employees may
take advantage of services that they would never otherwise “treat”
themselves to, and others may even feel compelled to engage in
employer-provided activities to be viewed as a “team player.” In the
latter case, employees might particularly object to being treated as
having received income, which makes denying an employer deduction a
more attractive option.
213. In the case of employer-provided cell phones, the IRS has taken the position that phones
offered to promote morale or attract talent are primarily compensatory in nature and, therefore,
taxable. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-72, 2011-36 I.R.B. 407. Similarly, the fact that lifestyle
enhancements are primarily compensatory in nature presents an even stronger case for taxation.
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Denying an employer deduction for lifestyle enhancements is also
preferable to taxing employees on the benefit because of the
administrative difficulties involved in taxing the employees. There are
two possible ways to tax employees on lifestyle enhancements, but both
options involve problematic valuation or recordkeeping.
First, employees could be taxed on the value of the benefits made
available to them at the workplace. If a Silicon Valley company provides
free breakfast and lunch in the cafeteria, free massages, and free drycleaning services, an employee might be taxed on a fixed amount each
month that represents the average use of all of those services. For
example, the amount could be based on the average price of daily
breakfast and lunch for one month added to the average monthly cost of
massages and dry-cleaning services. To calculate these averages,
employers might be allowed to make simplified conclusions, such as
assuming that certain services are used once per month.214 The problem
with this approach is twofold: on the one hand, it is almost certain to
overtax employees who do not frequently avail themselves of lifestyle
enhancements offered at their workplace; on the other hand, those who
most frequently avail themselves of these benefits may be undertaxed.
As discussed above, the use of many of these services—dance lessons or
yoga classes, for example—is not as ubiquitous as something like cell
phone or internet usage. Taxing employees on the value of available
benefits would not only be inaccurate in many cases but would likely be
met with fierce political resistance.215
Another option for taxing employees would be to tax them on the
value of only those benefits that they actually use. For example, an
employee would be taxed on the fair market value of any free meal that
he eats in the cafeteria and any dry-cleaning service that he uses in a
given month. While this approach would be better targeted than taxing
all available benefits, the recordkeeping and other administrative costs
make it an unattractive policy. Tracking the cost of each individual meal
consumed by an employee at work, for example, would likely be
extremely burdensome for the employer.216 While tracking less
214. For example, assume that employees can avail themselves of a thirty-minute Swedish
massage at the office and that the fair market value of this service is $50. Further, assume that
unlimited dry-cleaning services are offered and that the average monthly cost of dry cleaning in the
employer’s locality is $30. Employees would have additional compensation each month of $50 plus
$30 if these services were offered at their workplace.
215. The exception might be free cafeteria meals. If many or most employees eat employerprovided meals as opposed to bringing meals from home, then taxing an average monthly cost
would not necessarily overtax a significant number of employees.
216. On the other hand, it is possible that technology is or will eventually be available that would
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frequently consumed benefits (e.g., dance lessons) would be less
burdensome, it would still impose additional administrative costs that
might not justify the revenue collected. Additionally, benefits that are
infrequently consumed may be less likely to be perceived as income by
employees,217 and having inconsistent amounts of tax withheld month to
month may be confusing to salaried employees.
Due to these valuation and recordkeeping issues, and due to the
fundamental differences between lifestyle enhancements and other types
of fringe benefits, a better approach in this context is to deny a deduction
to the employer for all or a portion of the cost of the benefit. In that case,
the employee would not have income upon receipt of the benefit. The
result, in effect, would be a form of surrogate taxation where the
employer is taxed on the benefit to the employee. Consider, for example,
an employer that provides free dance lessons worth $100 to an
employee. Under a system where such benefits were taxable to
employees, the employee would include $100 of income and, assuming a
marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent, would owe tax of $35. Under a
system that instead denied a deduction to the employer, the employee
would owe no tax on the $100 benefit. The employer, however, would
lose the $100 deduction. Assuming the employer’s marginal tax rate is
also thirty-five percent, the employer would lose a $35 benefit, and the
government would gain $35.218 Under either scenario, the government
receives a $35 benefit.219
Both scenarios are more beneficial than the current system, under
which employers take deductions for lifestyle enhancements but
employees do not include them in income;220 however, denying the
allow for fairly easy electronic tracking. For example, an employee could be required to take her
meal to a register in the cafeteria to be itemized, and the cost could be electronically attributed to
her via an employee ID number. The same system could be used for other workplace benefits.
Employers could then make a monthly accounting of these types of benefits and add the appropriate
amount of income to the employee’s paycheck.
217. The assumption here is that although the benefit may be infrequently consumed, it is too
valuable (or still consumed too frequently) to constitute a de minimis fringe benefit under section
132(e).
218. At a marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent, a $100 deduction would save a taxpayer $35 in
tax and is thus economically equivalent to a $35 benefit to the taxpayer.
219. Of course, tax rates among employees and employers will not always be identical. In cases
where employers’ tax rates exceed employees’ tax rates, denying employer deductions will generate
more revenue than taxing employees. On the other hand, for employers with net operating losses or
very low effective tax rates, denying employer deductions would raise less revenue than taxing
employees at fair market value.
220. If the marginal rates for both the employer and the employee were thirty-five percent, then
taxing the employee on a $100 benefit would result in a wash to the government because the $35 of
tax collected from the employee would be offset by the employer’s deduction, also worth $35. The
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employer’s deduction is a more practical approach in the case of lifestyle
enhancements. Denying an employer deduction would vastly simplify
the administrative burden of taxing lifestyle enhancements that are
offered to multiple employees. This approach would obviate the need to
keep track of actual consumption by various employees or to calculate
average use for various types of benefits. No additional tax
recordkeeping would be required at all. Although employers might
object to losing deductions for these types of benefits, denying
deductions to the employers who currently offer them—the Googles and
Facebooks of the world—will be more politically palatable than taxing
employees. Employers will likely undergo a cost-benefit analysis to
determine if they will continue offering such benefits. If the cost of
something like dry cleaning or yoga classes is not worth it to the
employer without the benefit of a deduction, then presumably employers
will shift to other, deductible forms of compensation.
Another option would be to deny employers some, but not all, of the
deduction for the cost of lifestyle enhancements. As discussed above,
this is the approach taken in section 274, which limits employer
deductions for business meals to fifty percent of the cost. In the case of
free on-site meals that are not eligible for exclusion under section 119,221
section 274 may already limit the employer’s deduction to fifty percent
(at the same time, interestingly, that such meals are includable in
employees’ income).222 In upcoming clarification regarding whether free
same would be the case for a system that denied a deduction to the employer (gain of $35 to the
government) but did not tax the employee (loss of $35 to the government). However, both of those
scenarios are better (by $35) than the current one, which involves a deduction for the employer (loss
of $35 to government) with no offsetting tax collected from the employee. In other words, the
current system puts the government at a revenue loss for each benefit conferred, equal to the value
of the employer’s deduction.
221. Under section 119 of the Code, on-site meals provided “for the convenience of the
employer” are not taxable to the employee. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a) (as amended in 1985).
Consider, for example, a bank that restricts employee lunch breaks to thirty minutes because of the
high volume of customers during the lunch hour. If employees are unable to obtain lunch off-site in
under thirty minutes, the bank can provide free on-site lunch to its employees without tax
consequences to the employees. Id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(b), 1(f) ex. 4. In the case of workplace
lifestyle enhancements, free cafeteria meals would not qualify for exclusion under section 119 if
they were not offered for the convenience of the employer, i.e., if they were not offered for a
substantial noncompensatory business purpose. See id. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i).
222. Free cafeteria meals that qualify for exclusion under section 119 are fully deductible to the
employer, notwithstanding the fifty percent limitation under section 274(n) for deducting business
meals. See I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B) (2012) (excluding de minimis fringes from the limitation); id.
§ 132(e) (including section 119 meals in the definition of “de minimis fringes”). But in the case of
free on-site meals that do not qualify for exclusion under section 119 or section 132, the law
concerning deductibility is somewhat unclear. If meals are taxable as compensation to employees,
presumably they should be fully deductible under section 162 from the employer’s perspective. To
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on-site cafeteria meals at companies like Google and Facebook are
taxable,223 policymakers should also clarify whether section 274 applies
to the employer. If it does, Congress may wish to implement a parallel
scheme for other, comparable lifestyle enhancements that limits
employer deductions to fifty percent while exempting the benefits from
employee taxation.
Employers may argue that most lifestyle enhancements offered at the
workplace are de minimis. However, it is important to note that the
lifestyle enhancements discussed here—massages, dance classes, and the
like—generally do not constitute de minimis fringe benefits under
section 132(e). Recall that a de minimis fringe is a noncash benefit “the
value of which [is] . . . so small as to make accounting for it
unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”224 Generally, the
frequency with which a benefit is provided to an employee is taken into
account in determining whether the value is de minimis. 225 Thus,
flowers, fruit, and similar property provided to employees “under special
circumstances (e.g., on account of illness, outstanding performance, or
family crisis)” are considered to be de minimis, while season tickets to
the theater and daily commuting use of an employer-provided car are
impose tax on the employees and limit the employer’s deduction would effectively tax the benefit
twice. However, on its face, the section 274(n) deduction limitation appears to apply because the
exception for “expenses treated as compensation” under section 274(e)(2) covers “entertainment,
amusement, or recreation” but does not reference meals. See id. § 274(n)(2)(A). On the other hand,
the legislative history to section 274(n) clearly contemplates that meals treated as employee
compensation should be fully deductible. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 124 (1985) (“[T]he cost of a
meal or of an entertainment activity is fully deductible if the full value thereof is taxed as
compensation to the recipients . . . .” (emphasis added)).
223. Treasury and the IRS have put “[g]uidance under [section] 119 . . . regarding employerprovided meals” on their 2014–2015 Priority Guidance Plan. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra
note 146, at 10. Because section 119 does not apply in the absence of a substantial
noncompensatory business purpose, the daily provision of free on-site meals (often of the gourmet
variety) at Silicon Valley companies like Google and Facebook is likely at odds with section 119.
The current practice, however, appears to be for many employers to not include these meals in
employees’ income. See Maremont, supra note 7.
The proper application of section 119 in this context is beyond the scope of this analysis and has
been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Givati, supra note 16; Lomax, supra note 8; Lundin & Cowan,
supra note 8; Maremont, supra note 7; Richard Rubin, No Free Lunch for Companies as IRS
Weighs Meal Tax Rules, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-09-04/no-free-lunch-for-companies-as-irs-weighs-meal-tax-rules
[https://perma.cc/3VA6-3GM7]. For purposes of this discussion, we are focused on potential
methods of taxing meals (and other lifestyle enhancements) that do not otherwise qualify for income
exclusion under section 119, section 132, or some other Code provision.
224. I.R.C. § 132(e).
225. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). However, where it is administratively
difficult to determine frequency with respect to an individual employee, frequency can be
determined with respect to the entire workforce. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(2).
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not.226
As discussed in Section II.A, lifestyle enhancements have emerged as
a way for employers to blur the lines between employees’ business and
personal lives in order for employers to attract talent and encourage
workplace productivity. Thus, most of these benefits are available to
employees on a daily or otherwise frequent basis rather than just on
special occasions. This level of frequency would prevent lifestyle
enhancements from being considered de minimis even if the fair market
value of a single use of a particular service were small. Consider, for
example, an employer that offers free laundry machines for personal use
at the office. While a comparable service at a laundromat may only cost
a few dollars for onetime use, free anytime use for all employees would
not be considered de minimis.227 Further, the Treasury regulations under
section 132 emphasize the frequency with which benefits are made
“available” to employees rather than the frequency with which benefits
are “used” by employees.228 Thus, free laundry services would not be
considered de minimis merely because few employees avail themselves
of the benefit.229
CONCLUSION
Twenty-first century fringe benefits present a significant challenge to
the integrity of the income tax system. Currently, many fringe benefits
go unreported, a position that the IRS commonly accepts and, to date,
for which Congress appears to give its tacit approval. This laissez-faire
approach is inequitable230 and inefficient; and if it continues, taxpayer
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2). An occasional group meal or food at a holiday party would
qualify as a de minimis fringe benefit under section 132(e).
227. An analogous example in the regulations is personal use of an employer copy machine. Such
use is de minimis only if it is “occasional” and if the employer “exercises sufficient control and
imposes significant restrictions on the personal use of the machine so that at least 85 percent of the
use of the machine is for business purposes.” Id. § 1.132-6(e)(1). This suggests that daily,
unrestricted personal use of an employer’s copy machine would not be de minimis.
228. See, e.g., id. § 1.132-6(d)(2)(i)(A) (“Whether meal money or local transportation fare is
provided to an employee on an occasional basis will depend upon the frequency i.e., the availability
of the benefit and regularity with which the benefit is provided by the employer to the employee.”
(emphasis in original)); id. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (stating that country club or gym membership not de
minimis “regardless of the frequency with which the employee uses the facility”).
229. Even if certain lifestyle enhancements are offered only on an occasional basis to employees,
the fair market value of those benefits may still be too large for the benefits to be considered de
minimis, although it is unclear exactly where to draw the line in value. For example, occasional
theater and sports tickets are considered de minimis, but one-time weekend use of an employer’s
beach house is not de minimis. Id. § 1.132-6(e)(1)–(2).
230. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance in this sphere of the law is bound to have a significant
corrosive effect in other spheres of tax compliance.231
When it comes to modern fringe benefits, Congress has several
possible options that it should consider: exclude them from employee
income, include them in employee income, or deny employer
deductibility of such expenditures. In choosing among these three
options, Congress should examine each fringe benefit carefully (or
delegate this responsibility to the Treasury Department). In those cases
when individual wealth accretion is minimal and little tax revenue is at
risk, Congress should exclude the fringe benefit from income. But, as in
most cases, when individual wealth accretion is significant and tax
revenue is at risk, Congress should collect revenue from either the
employee or the employer. When possible, Congress should tax income
that inures to employees. And when employers make valuable fringe
benefits available for personal use that are difficult to tax to employees,
Congress should instead deny employers deductions for part or all of the
concomitant expenditures that they incur.
Rather than focus on today’s new breed of fringe benefits, some
commentators might argue that congressional energies would be better
spent focused on so-called big-ticket items, such as ascertaining the
appropriate capital gain tax rates, the tax treatment of employer-provided
health insurance as income, or whether residential mortgage interest
should remain deductible. However, modern fringe benefits are a much
larger revenue source than commonly presumed, and their lack of
taxation necessitates immediate congressional attention. Congress
should not dally; it should reform the Code to strengthen the integrity of
the nation’s tax system.

231. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL
SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE
151, 167 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005) (noting that “if people believe that cheating on taxes,
corruption, or abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat
on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions”); cf. Zelenak, supra note 15, at 854
(arguing that “customary deviations [such as sanctioning the nonreporting of frequent-flier miles]
may have contributed to an insufficient respect for the dictates of the Code on the part of high-level
Treasury Department and IRS officials”).

